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Beliefs Scale (SOBS). While drawing from the empirical literature on essentialist beliefs 
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are both essentialist and non-essentialist in nature, specifically including beliefs rooted in 
agentic and social constructionist perspectives as yet untested in the empirical literature. 
Participants (N = 332) were a national sample of sexual minority adults ranging in 
age from 18-74 years. Data was collected using through the use of an internet-based 
survey, and exploratory factor analysis was used to investigate the underlying factor 
structure of the SOBS. An initial 91 items were reduced to a 35-item scale using a best-fit 
four-factor solution that accounted for 35.33% of the obtained variance. Based on their 
 
component items, the four subscales of the SOBS were named Naturalness, Discreteness, 
Entitativity, and Personal and Social Importance of Sexual Orientation. 
Relationships between sexual orientation beliefs and right-wing authoritarianism, 
need for cognitive structure, collective self-esteem, and sociodemographic characteristics 
of participants were explored and results of these analyses are presented. Notably, the 
level of endorsement of specific types of beliefs, as measured by the SOBS subscales, 
was found to differ significantly according to gender and sexual orientation self-labeling 
of participants. Results broadly suggest the need for further investigation of popularly-
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A perusal of headlines in the popular media makes it clear that people expend 
great deals of time and energy trying to make sense of sociodemographic variations and 
identity-based differences. Stories that touch on issues related to sexual orientation in 
particular receive frequent and energetic attention. The “shock” of athletes’ and 
politicians’ coming-out stories, ongoing and virulent debate about same-sex marriage, 
scrutiny of the legality and ethics—not to mention logic, in a time of war—of restricting 
military service under a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy: these and other news items hint 
at the very real (and very public) consequences of common beliefs about diversity and 
identity. The etiology of social group differences has long been a focus of psychological 
scholarship, but only recently has attention been given to publicly held beliefs about such 
differences. In the last decade, a promising body of literature has emerged, documenting 
and explicating peoples’ tendency to “essentialize”—or view as natural and inherent—a 
great number of social categories. 
 Psychological essentialism was defined by Medin and Ortony (1989) as the 
popular belief that members of a social category possess a shared, underlying similarity 
(an “essence”) that defines them. The characteristics produced by this essence are 
believed to be immutable: internal, persistent, and consistent across time. Empirical work 
in this domain suggests that many essentialist beliefs emanate from the idea that 
biologically based differences exist between groups. For example, belief in a “gay gene” 
is an essentialist way of accounting for real and/or perceived differences between sexual 
minority and heterosexual people. However, essentialist beliefs do not necessarily require 
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biological explanations, or any explanation, in fact; rather, these beliefs simply hinge on 
an understanding of social groups as fundamentally different from one another. A person 
may believe men and women are biologically driven to different roles or behaviors (e.g., 
“fight or flight” responses attributed to men and “tend and befriend” responses attributed 
to women), or that they are socialized from a young age to behave differently. In either 
case, the resulting belief is that women and men are fundamentally different. 
 Existing literature on essentialism suggests that traditionally, essentialist beliefs 
about a social group are related to stereotype endorsement and negative attitudes toward 
that group (e.g. Haslam & Levy, 2007; Jayaratne et al., 2006). However, this relationship 
has been demonstrated to be somewhat more complicated where beliefs about sexual 
orientation are concerned. Increasing evidence suggests that beliefs in genetic causes of 
sexuality are linked to affirmative attitudes about lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) 
people, contrary to the findings for other sociodemographic variables such as race and 
gender (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). This is consistent with much current LGB advocacy, 
which often argues that a biological predisposition to a minority sexual orientation 
requires conferral of equal protections and rights to LGB people under the law (Fassinger 
& Arseneau, 2007; for an example, see Human Rights Campaign, 2006). Yet, while some 
essentialist beliefs may be associated with positive attitudes toward LGB people, recent 
research has found support for a two-factor structure of essentialist beliefs, where one 
factor is associated with positive attitudes toward “homosexuality” and the other factor is 
associated with negative attitudes (Hegarty & Pratto).  
It bears noting that the existing essentialism literature largely has been confined to 
the study of beliefs about social groups that have been oppressed historically (e.g., 
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women, African Americans, gay men). Yet, research has not been undertaken to explore 
lay beliefs held by members of historically oppressed groups. Thus, we know little about 
the nature of beliefs that sexual minority people themselves hold about sexual orientation. 
It is reasonable to presume that some sexual minority people may have served as 
participants in prior studies investigating beliefs about sexual orientation; however, the 
sexual orientation demographic breakdown of study samples has characteristically been 
unreported, often because the information was not collected in the first place.  
The present study sought to contribute to the existing literature on beliefs about 
social group differences, and specifically sexual orientation, through the creation and 
initial validation of a new measure of sexual orientation beliefs. This measure and the 
study within which it is positioned would add to the current body of knowledge is several 
distinct ways. First, the project moves away from the traditional focus on dominant social 
group members’ beliefs about non-dominant social group members and instead 
investigates sexual minority people’s own beliefs about sexual orientation. In doing so, 
the present study recognizes that people with minority sexual orientations, who arguably 
have unique experiences based on their distinct sexual identities (e.g., lesbians), are 
frequently united under a broader “umbrella” community of lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people. Finally, the project proposes to investigate lay ontological assumptions that are 
other than essentialist in nature. Specifically, agentic and social constructionist 
perspectives are offered as potential sources of beliefs about social categories, as yet 





Review of the Literature 
The overall purpose of the present study was to examine the content(s) and 
structure(s) of individuals’ beliefs about sexual orientation. In this chapter, a review of 
the relevant literature is provided. First, an overview of psychological essentialism is 
presented, and recent empirical work on essentialist beliefs about social groups is 
discussed. Findings general to social identities and particular to sexual orientation are 
highlighted. Strengths and weaknesses in the current body of essentialist literature are 
briefly summarized. Subsequently, discussion of other potential sources of sexual 
orientation beliefs—specifically, social constructionism and constructivist agency—will 
be offered, along with implications of these particular conceptual frameworks for 
individual theories of sexual orientation. Finally, established and prospective implications 
of essentialist, social constructionist, and agentic beliefs about sexual orientation for 
counseling psychology will be considered.   
It is important to note here that any discussion which includes specific naming of 
sociodemographic categories is fraught: socially acceptable group labels are constantly in 
flux, and use or misuse of any label brings with it the potential for reification of 
difference, offense to in-group members and allies, confusion on the part of out-group 
readers, and inadvertent political commentary. Hence, I would note that for the purposes 
of this literature review, I have chosen to retain the language (including decisions about 
capitalization) of the original work even where it may be inconsistent with current 
professionally preferred or popular usage (e.g., “blacks,” “homosexuals”). However, in 
discussion of the present project, the vocabulary employed will specifically reflect the 
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positionality of this author in the context of this study. 
 While the present project centered on beliefs about sexual orientation, there are 
several reasons for which both gender and sexuality were considered in the planning and 
execution of this study. First, the empirical research on essentialism is strongest on 
gender, where we know essentializing begins at least in preschool and continues through 
adulthood; furthermore, gender frequently has been found to be rated more highly on 
properties related to essentialism (e.g., naturalness, necessity, immutability, discreteness, 
and stability; Prentice & Miller, 2006) than other social categories. Thus, a consideration 
of gender was at times expedient, as it provided a good source for clear examples where 
data directly related to sexual orientation are lacking. Moreover, many scholars have 
articulated the popular conflation of gender and sexual orientation that renders difficult a 
discussion of only one or the other (cf. Fassinger, 2000). For example, public attitudes 
toward gay men have been found to be more negative than attitudes toward lesbians, with 
the most negative attitudes being held by heterosexual men about gay men (Herek, 1994). 
Furthermore, recent work has considered more specifically the interrelationships among 
biological sex, social gender, sexual orientation or identity, and gender orientation or 
identity and argues that attempts to distinguish one from another may be futile and 
artificial (Fassinger & Arseneau, 2007). For the purposes of this study, sex is not 
discussed. Gender is used in reference to traditional conceptualizations of individuals as 
either masculine/male/men or feminine/female/women. Gender identity or orientation is 
defined as the constellation of characteristics which may be perceived as “gendered” 
(e.g., behaviors, appearance) and the recognition of one’s self as masculine or feminine. 
Sexual orientation is defined for these purposes as sexual/affectional attractions and 
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behaviors, and sexual minority and LGB (lesbian, gay, and bisexual) are used to signify 
individuals with same-gender directed attractions and behaviors. However, as this study 
sought in part to investigate the definitions and conceptualizations individuals hold about 
sexual orientation, these operationalizations were not necessarily expected to transfer 
beyond the scope of the original proposal. 
Psychological Essentialism 
Essentialism is not a concept unique to psychology; discussion of whether objects 
and individuals possess a basic “essence,” a fundamental quality that makes them what 
they are, can be found in various literatures tracing back at least 2,400 years (Gelman & 
Hirschfeld, 1999). However, psychology’s relationship with essentialism has a much 
briefer history. Allport (1954) introduced the term “essentialism” to the field in his 
classic work on prejudice approximately fifty years ago when he proposed that belief in a 
group essence is a fundamental attribute of a prejudiced personality (Demoulin, Leyens, 
& Yzerbyt, 2006; Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006). More recently, Medin and 
Ortony (1989) are credited with coining the phrase “psychological essentialism,” which 
they defined as the belief among laypeople1 that many categories have essences. Briefly, 
they explicated psychological essentialism as a theory of category representation, in 
which members of an “essentialized” category are believed to possess a shared 
underlying similarity that defines them; this essence and the characteristics it produces 
are believed to be immutable. Prentice and Miller (2006), extrapolating from a variety of 
research studies in this area, illustrate essentialist beliefs using the category “wolf” as an 
                                                 
1 A hierarchical differential between psychologists and non-psychologists potentially suggested by this 




[A] wolf remains a wolf even if it is wearing sheep’s clothing…, even if a doctor 
performs an operation that makes it look like a sheep…, and even if it eats 
something that turns it into an object resembling a sheep…. Moreover, a wolf will 
develop wolflike characteristics even if it grows up in a community of sheep (p. 
129). 
Thus, psychological essentialism regards features such as traits and behaviors as intrinsic 
and consistent over time. As reflected in the above quote, initial work on essentialism 
focused on “natural kinds,” or groupings presumed to be bound by a natural law, such as 
biological species (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006). Indeed, it has been 
suggested that for an object to be essentialized, it must be perceived as a natural kind, and 
vice versa (Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992).  
Essentialism and Social Categories 
More recently, however, attention has shifted to social categories such as race and 
ethnicity. Much of the literature in this area is cognitive or developmental in its 
positioning and focuses on how infants and children come to make sense of the world. 
For example, research on cognitive essentialism suggests that children as young as three 
years of age are able to differentiate between physique, as a feature of individuals that has 
potential to change, and race, as one that does not (Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999). 
Interestingly, “human artifacts” (i.e., objects constructed by humans, such as “coffee 
pot”) are not prone to essentialist explanation by children, yet social groups—arguably 
also human constructions—are (Gelman & Hirschfeld). This research subsequently has 
given rise to a smaller yet significant body of literature attending to the content, structure, 
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and correlates of adults’ essentialist beliefs about social categories, particularly those 
categories in which they do not claim membership (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006; 
Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 2004). This latter body of work 
provided the basis for the current study. It is important to note that the literature on 
essentialist beliefs about social categories typically does not attempt to reveal “truths” 
about the essentialized group; rather, it seeks to reveal “truths” that individuals construct 
about social categories.  
Rothbart and Taylor (1992) expanded upon early work by Medin and Ortony 
(1989), who argued that people hold an inaccurate understanding of social categories as 
“natural kinds.” In their discussion, Rothbart and Taylor highlighted two specific 
qualities of essentialist beliefs: inalterability and inductive potential. According to this 
view, one of the primary aspects of essentialist beliefs about social categories is that the 
essence of that group is perceived as fixed over time and across individuals (e.g., the core 
trait[s] of a given ethnic group does not change). The other core aspect is that it is 
possible to use knowledge of an individual’s membership in a social category to infer 
characteristics about that individual (e.g., knowing a person belongs to a certain ethnic 
group allows one to “know” other things about that individual). This inductive potential 
is bidirectional, such that it also is possible for the attributes of an individual or a few 
members of a group to be extrapolated to all members of that group. 
Drawing from themes in the essentialist literature as well as that on social 
categorization and stereotyping, Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron (1997) provided a 
theoretical mapping of potential components of essentialist beliefs. The nine domains 
identified by the authors were discreteness, uniformity, informativeness, naturalness, 
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immutability, stability, inherence, necessity, and exclusivity. The following are brief 
definitions of these components (synthesized from Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron [1997] 
and Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst [2000]): 
Discreteness: Membership in an essential category is clear-cut; people either 
belong to the category or they do not; 
Uniformity: Essential categories are comprised of members who are very similar 
to one another; 
Informativeness: Knowledge of an individual’s membership in an essential 
category allows for other judgments to be made about that individual; 
Naturalness: Essential categories are naturally occurring or bound by a natural 
law; non-essential groupings are comparably artificial;   
Immutability: Membership in an essential category is difficult to change; members 
cannot easily become non-members, and non-members cannot easily become 
members; 
Stability: Essential categories are stable across time and have been throughout 
history; 
Inherence: Essential categories possess an underlying reality; despite surface 
similarities and differences, category members are the same on a core level;  
Necessity: Essential categories have necessary features, without which it is 
impossible to be a member; 
Exclusivity: Membership in an essential category may preclude membership in 
any other category; non-essential categories allow membership in multiple groups 
concurrently.  
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It should be noted that subsequent scholarly attention to essentialist beliefs among adults 
has been diverse in methodological and disciplinary positioning, from qualitative (e.g., 
Wren, 2002) to experimental (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2001), and social psychological 
(e.g., Kalish, 2002) to anthropological (e.g., Gil-White, 2001). Perhaps as a result, the 
terms articulated above are not common to all work on psychological essentialism. 
 As a theory of lay beliefs, psychological essentialism does not require that one be 
able to directly define the “essence” of a category, nor detail which features of a member 
of the category are produced by that essence. However, biological factors frequently are 
cited as the cause of essential social classifications. For example, it is commonly held that 
racial categories are circumscribed by physical attributes such as skin color or facial 
features. While Medin and Ortony (1989) focused their definition of psychological 
essentialism on the ideas of laypeople, it is critical to note that essentialist beliefs may 
be—and frequently are—endorsed by psychologists themselves. For instance, 
biologically based essentialist explanations form the basis of many social scientific areas 
of inquiry, such as genetic and endocrine research, sociobiology, and evolutionary 
psychology (DeLamater & Hyde, 1998). This complicates the discussion of lay 
essentialist beliefs, which may simultaneously inform and be informed by formal 
psychological theories or well-established findings. Thus, essentialist epistemologies and 
lay essentialist beliefs are conceptually different, though perhaps not entirely unrelated. 
Jayaratne and colleagues (2006) detailed scientific findings that have been popularly 
assimilated as “genetic lay theories” from the eugenics era to present. Among the most 
extreme examples, the authors noted that explicit assertions of genetic inferiority were 
used by Hitler to promote racial hatred toward Jews and as a basis for anti-miscegenation 
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laws in the United States. While in recent years these beliefs largely have been replaced 
by more covert forms of anti-Semitism and racism, current debate about the existence of 
a “gay gene” reminds us that genetic lay theories still are relied upon as a way to 
understand sociodemographic differences (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006; 
Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Jayaratne et al., 2006). Political and other implications 
associated with essentialist beliefs will be considered later in this chapter. 
 Psychological essentialism describes traits, attitudes, and/or behaviors as internal, 
persistent, and consistent across time. Such beliefs do not necessarily require biological 
explanations. Indeed, popular (and professional) “nature-nurture” debates frequently are 
tantamount to a rivalry of competing essentialisms. For example, some psychodynamic 
theories focus on unconscious dynamics between a parent and a child as an explanation 
for gender differences (e.g., Chodorow, 1978). Additionally, so-called “cultural feminist” 
approaches account for the social and environmental experiences that produce gender 
differences (e.g., women’s “different voice;” Gilligan, 1982). Though neither of these 
paradigms cites biological explanations of difference per se, they equally position gender 
differences as real, based on early experiences, and producing deep-seated within-group 
similarities (Bohan, 1993; Tavris, 1999). Thus, such “nurture”-oriented theories also may 
be understood as fundamentally essentialist in character, even as they attend to social or 
cultural influences.  
Why Do Essentialist Beliefs Matter? 
Much research on psychological essentialism theoretically or empirically explores 
the potential relationship between essentialist beliefs and prejudice or discrimination. 
Frequently these arguments follow Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) social identity theory, 
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which stipulates that people are motivated to differentiate between groups in order to 
discriminate in favor of the group(s) in which they claim membership (Hegarty & Pratto, 
2001). For example, a common finding in the literature is that people who make 
essentialist attributions about an individual’s behavior are judgmental and punitive 
(Heyman & Giles, 2006). Many of these studies focus specifically on essentialism 
occurring within the context of the cognitive development of children, who have been 
found to privilege similarity and even devalue diversity among individuals in a group 
(Miller, 2004; cf. Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999; Heyman & Giles, 2006 for more detailed 
discussion of cognitive essentialism among children).  
One recent study (Bastian & Haslam, 2006) sought to investigate empirically the 
purported link between adults’ essentialist beliefs and stereotype endorsement. The 
researchers administered measures of psychological essentialism along with five other 
measures of individual differences previously associated with stereotyping (i.e., need for 
cognitive closure, right-wing authoritarianism, attributional complexity, need to evaluate, 
and social dominance orientation). The authors also measured participants’ knowledge of 
common stereotypes associated with nine different social groups (e.g., males, Japanese, 
and lawyers), as well as levels of endorsement of these stereotypes. The researchers 
found that while essentialist beliefs were not correlated with knowledge of the social 
group stereotypes, essentialist beliefs were positively associated with endorsement of the 
stereotypes. Multiple regression analysis revealed essentialist beliefs as the largest 
independent contributor to stereotype endorsement; among the individual difference 
scales, only right-wing authoritarianism made an independent contribution. Notably, 
essentialist beliefs were significantly correlated with endorsement of both positive and 
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negative social group stereotypes. 
This last finding converges with a debate in the literature about whether essential 
beliefs have positive or negative (or neutral or mixed) implications for the individuals 
who hold them, and for members of the groups targeted by essentialist beliefs. It has been 
noted, as in the study described above, that social group stereotypes arising from 
essentialist claims may have positive or negative valence (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; 
Heyman & Giles, 2006). This is true for biologically based essentialist beliefs as well as 
those focusing on other sources of difference. For example, Tavris (1999) observes that 
cultural feminist theories that reinforce gender differences, presumably with the intention 
of positively reframing the outcomes of a gendered social hierarchy, implicitly or 
explicitly position women as superior in some capacity (e.g., morality; Gilligan, 1982). 
Are lay beliefs emanating from such theories positive for the individual who holds them, 
and/or for the women (and men) they target? 
It has been argued that regardless of content, essentialist beliefs may be typically 
problematic. Bohan (1993), for example, contends that because essentialist beliefs about 
gender homogenize women and fail to account for individual or cultural differences, they 
are inherently problematic. She also notes that the “female” attributes prized by cultural 
or difference feminisms are frequently deferent, and undervalued in a heteropatriarchal 
culture. Particularizing such traits to women obscures the role of oppression in fostering 
those traits, thereby allowing it to perpetuate:  
If women’s relationality is a product of oppression…then when we cherish our 
relationality, are we legitimizing the oppression that created it? This question has 
frightening political implications. If the oppressed can be led to value their own 
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oppression, then liberation becomes impossible (p. 9). 
Many others have likewise argued that essentialist beliefs about social groups frequently 
are used to support existing inequalities based on sociodemographic characteristics such 
as race or gender, where membership in the dominant group is viewed as inherently 
conferring preferable skills or qualities (Haslam & Levy, 2007; Mahalingam & 
Rodriguez, 2003). Others still have expressed concern that endorsement of essentialist 
beliefs may be linked to motivational helplessness, and moreover could actually reflect 
faulty reasoning skills, and as such merit examination and potential intervention (Heyman 
& Giles, 2006). Little empirical work has investigated any of these claims, though some 
have been theoretically well articulated. 
 Conversely, essentialist beliefs may be associated with positive outcomes. 
Heyman and Giles (2006) cite empirical research suggesting that essentialist attributions 
can be helpful to individuals diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome, in that organic 
explanations appear to relieve self-blame. Wren (2002) found that parents of transgender 
adolescents who believed in biological causation of transgenderism held more benign 
attitudes toward their children. Even in cases where the specific details of an attribution 
are difficult for an individual to comprehend, it may still provide, to borrow a term from 
Medin and Ortony (1989), an “essence placeholder” serving a positive purpose. 
Additionally, it is important to note that essentialist beliefs recently have been used in 
policy and advocacy work to advance the right of groups for whom an essentialized 
identity—particularly a biologically based one, if it can be established—may translate 
into civil protections (Fassinger & Arseneau, 2007; Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 
2006; Jayaratne et al., 2006). This is a dramatic shift from prior efforts to legalize 
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discrimination based on the presumed or “proven” genetic inferiority of some social 
groups. Much current sexual orientation advocacy, for example, posits that sexuality is an 
inborn trait that individuals cannot freely choose; as such, sexual minority people should 
be granted the same protections afforded to racial and ethnic minority people as a 
“protected class” under the law (e.g., Human Rights Campaign, 2006). 
In light of the opposing views on the relative harm or benefit (and to whom) of 
essentialist beliefs, further study of such beliefs may provide needed contribution to the 
understanding of the type of influence they exert and potential circumstantial or category-
based variation. This understanding may in turn inform educational or clinical 
interventions designed to address cross-cultural interactions, attitudes and behaviors 
toward out-group members, and potentially even the individual’s sense of personal 
limitations or opportunities based on social group membership. Furthermore, given the 
high legal and political stakes sometimes associated with beliefs about social groups, 
Jayaratne et al. (2006) suggest that for researchers, there is an “urgent need to take into 
account how [essentialist beliefs] function in social reality” (p. 80). 
Empirical Study of Essentialist Beliefs  
As noted previously, psychological essentialism (hereafter simply “essentialism”) 
and its relationship to social identities is a young but growing area of study, and the 
existing scholarship has been conducted in a variety of disciplines from a host of 
standpoints. As a result, consensus has not been reached about the specific components of 
essentialist beliefs, nor is there a shared vocabulary for describing these components. 
Nevertheless, at least one study (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000) sought to 
investigate essentialist beliefs specifically using the domain areas articulated by Yzerbyt 
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and colleagues (1997; i.e., discreteness, uniformity, informativeness, naturalness, 
immutability, stability, inherence, necessity, exclusivity). In this study, the researchers 
created a general measure of essentialist beliefs about social categories based on these 
nine qualities. The resulting measure was administered to 40 undergraduate students. 
Half of the participants were asked to rate 20 social groups, each representing a different 
identity category (e.g., “Asians,” representing ethnic groups; “Catholics,” representing 
religions; “doctors,” representing professions) on each of the nine domains, the other half 
were asked to rate 20 different social groups from the same identity categories (e.g., 
“Hispanics,” “Jews,” “blue-collar workers”). Each domain was defined by the researchers 
and then presented on a 9-point bipolar scale; for example, students read the definition of 
“uniformity” and then ranked each group on a scale from “diverse, differing” to 
“uniform, similar.” Participants were also asked to rate each social identity on how 
favorably regarded it is by the general public on a 10-point scale from “low” to “high.” 
Factor analysis of the essentialist beliefs measure created by the researchers suggested 
that the nine essentialist domains were best described as two factors. The first, comprised 
of discreteness, naturalness, immutability, stability, and necessity, was named “natural 
kinds” by the researchers; this factor encompassed essentialist beliefs that most closely 
related to biological lay theories. The second factor, “entitativity,” consisted of 
uniformity, informativeness, inherence, and exclusivity, beliefs associated with group 
homogeneity and coherence. 
Of the social categories and identities rated, genders, races, and ethnicities had the 
highest “natural kind” ratings, suggesting they were most viewed as biologically based. 
The categories and identities rated highest on entitativity were homosexuals, Jews, AIDS 
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patients, and political groups, suggesting a perceived homogeneity of group members. A 
significant statistical interaction also was observed such that social identities that were 
rated high on natural kindness and low on entitativity were perceived as being more 
socially favored than groups that were rated high on natural kindness and entitativity. The 
authors note that “[c]onsequently, categories that are relatively essentialized on both 
dimensions—exemplified by the disabilities, ethnic groups, Jews, women, blacks, and 
AIDS patients—tend to be especially stigmatized (p. 123).”  
The two factors observed in the research conducted by Haslam, Rothschild, and 
Ernst (2000)—natural kinds and entitativity—have been supported by further research 
investigating essentialist beliefs about specific social groups, including women, African 
Americans, gay men, and individuals with mental disorders (e.g., Haslam, Rothschild, & 
Ernst; Haslam & Ernst, 2002). Demoulin, Leyens, and Yzerbyt (2006) further replicated 
the two-factor structure in their study of twenty-four social groups. While previous work 
had not addressed why some social groups were seen as predominantly natural and others 
as predominantly entitative, the authors postulated that the differences may be in 
perception of whether membership in the given category was “forced” or “chosen.” They 
hypothesized that forced social categories (FSC) would be rated highly natural but 
moderately entitative, whereas chosen social categories would be rated highly entitative 
but moderately natural. This consideration marks a notable departure from a strict 
interpretation of essentialism as related to social categories. Because essentialism was 
originally defined as the belief in a fundamental and inherent essence driving category 
membership, the idea that membership in a category can be chosen could be interpreted 
as being representing a lack of endorsement of the essential nature of the category. In 
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other words, it is possible that the entitativity factor may capture beliefs that are in fact 
non-essential. However, the researchers did not comment explicitly on this possibility. 
In this study, thirty individuals (a Belgian community-based sample) completed a 
measure compiled by the researches wherein they were asked to rate 24 social categories 
(12 likely to be seen as forced social categories, 12 likely to be seen as chosen social 
categories) on 14 dimensions of essentialism. As predicted, results suggested a main 
effect for essentialism factor (natural kind vs. entitative) and group type (FSC vs. CSC), 
as well as an interaction effect such that FSC groups were higher on natural kindness and 
lower on entitativity than CSC groups and vice-versa. These results provide further 
support to the argument that essentialist beliefs, while comprised of multiple domains, 
fundamentally fall along two dimensions: natural kinds and entitativity. Furthermore, 
groups into which an individual is perceived as being born (“forced social groups”) are 
seen as being higher on features consistent with natural kinds, such as a biological basis 
and immutability. Groups in which a person may choose membership (“chosen social 
groups”) are perceived to be higher on features related entitativity, such as homogeneity 
of members and informativeness. Regrettably, sexual orientation was not among the 
categories investigated in this study. It certainly would be possible, based on the current 
empirical and theoretical literature on sexual orientation and gender identity, to build an 
argument in favor of either a “forced” or a “chosen” view of these particular social 
identities. 
A small number of empirical studies were located that directly explored 
essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation. In the first of these, Hegarty and Pratto 
(2001) sought to assess essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation and their potential 
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relationship to anti-gay attitudes. A sample of 116 heterosexual college students 
completed a measure of essentialist beliefs created by the researchers for the study, as 
well as Herek’s (1994) Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG) scale, a 10-
item measure on a 9-point scale (where low scores are indicative of tolerance and high 
scores indicate condemnation). The essentialist belief measure was a 9-item measure 
tapping four domains: early determinacy (the belief that sexual orientation is determined 
early in the life-span); essential identity (the belief that sexual orientation is a basic 
organizing principle of individual psychology); adult fixity (the belief that sexual 
orientation is fixed once it emerges); and homosexual/heterosexual binary (the belief that 
people can be divided into two categories based on sexual orientation). On the whole, the 
language used in the belief scale items addressed sexual orientation broadly rather than 
homosexuality exclusively, as evidenced by the item, “Sexual orientation is caused by 
biological factors such as genes and hormones.” Two of the items addressed same-sex 
orientations only; for example, “In all cultures there are people who consider themselves 
homosexual.” One item in the measure specifically referenced bisexuality, “Bisexual 
people are fooling themselves and should make up their minds.” While the authors did 
not address these language choices expressly, it would appear that the items that were 
less “neutral” (i.e., focused on sexual minority people specifically rather than all sexual 
orientations generally) may have been difficult to construct in comprehensible manner 
that included heterosexuality. For example, it would make little sense to incorporate an 
item that read, “People of all sexual orientations are fooling themselves and should make 
up their minds.” However, the lack of parallelism in the scale items is notable. 
Results revealed two factors in the essentialist belief scale, “immutability” 
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(consisting of items developed to assess early determinacy and adult fixity) and 
“fundamentality” (essential identity and homosexual/heterosexual binary items). These 
factors appeared in many ways to be similar to the “natural kinds” and “entitativity” 
factors, respectively, obtained in several studies by Haslam and colleagues. The authors 
further found a significant negative correlation between the two essentialism factors; 
endorsement of one type of essentialist belief co-occurred with a rejection of the other. 
Notably, immutability beliefs were negatively correlated with Attitudes Toward Lesbians 
and Gay Men scores, whereas fundamentality beliefs were positively correlated with 
ATLG scores. Thus, individuals who perceived sexual orientation to be developed early 
and fixed across the lifespan indicated greater tolerance of gay men and lesbians, while 
participants who believed that sexual orientation is a significant and distinguishing aspect 
of individual identity endorsed attitudes that were more homonegative. The authors 
interpreted this finding as consistent with popular discussion and emerging evidence 
suggesting that people who believe homosexuality is inborn hold more benign attitudes 
than those who believe sexual orientation is a choice or under the control of the 
individual. 
A second study that specifically considered essentialist beliefs about sexual 
orientation was a focused examination of genetic lay theories (Jayaratne et al., 2006). The 
researchers investigated the extent to which participants held the belief that genes 
influence traits, at least partially, in lesbians and gay men, as well as in Blacks. The 
authors hypothesized that genetic lay theories about Blacks would be associated with 
negative attitudes, whereas genetic lay theories about gay men and lesbians would be 
associated with more positive attitudes. In support of their hypotheses, they noted the 
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different social discourses involving genetic lay theories for these two groups: 
historically, genes have been cited to reify the supposed racial inferiority of Black 
Americans, while biological predisposition to homosexuality has been associated with 
tolerance of sexual minorities. For the purposes of this review, results pertinent to 
lesbians and gay men (LGs) will be discussed. 
A total of 600 White American adults were interviewed by telephone; the protocol 
included four questions about the influence of genes for Blacks and two questions 
assessed the role of genes for LGs (i.e., whether the respondent believed genes 
contributed to differences between heterosexuals and homosexuals, and if so, to what 
extent). Attitudes toward Blacks and LGs were also assessed through four questions each, 
created by the researchers (e.g., level of agreement with the statement, “marriage between 
homosexuals should be illegal.”) A sizeable minority of participants endorsed some 
genetic basis for sexual orientation; furthermore, genetic lay theories were significantly 
predictive of less discriminatory attitudes toward LGs over and above demographic 
features of the participants (demographics alone accounted for 31% of the variance, the 
addition of genetic beliefs accounted for a total 35%). Men, and respondents who were 
older, more politically conservative, and more religious held greater discriminatory 
attitudes toward LGs than participants who were female, younger, more liberal, and less 
religious, respectively. Notably, the researchers specifically dismissed individuals from 
study who were not White, due to its partial focus on racial prejudice. However, the 
researchers apparently collected no sexual orientation data from participants, and failed to 
account for the potential influence of sexual minority participants’ data in analysis or 
discussion.  
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Haslam and Levy (2007) conducted three studies investigating the level of 
endorsement of essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation, the factor structure of these 
beliefs, and the relationship between these beliefs and attitudes toward lesbians and gay 
men. In the first study, which focused specifically on gay men, a sample of college 
students completed a researcher-designed 7-item measure of essentialist beliefs on a 6-
point scale. An exploratory factor analysis revealed a 3-factor structure. For the second 
study, items were altered to focus on lesbians, and were administered to a sample of 
college students along with Herek’s (1994) Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men 
scale. Confirmatory factor analysis of the essentialist belief measure supported the 3-
factor structure found in study 1. These were labeled immutability, universality, and 
discreteness. Immutability items reflected a belief that sexual orientation is biologically 
based and fixed early in life, similar to the immutability factor found in previous research 
on homosexuality (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Discreteness items reflected belief in a 
defining characteristics and a sexual orientation binary, similar to Hegarty and Pratto’s 
(2001) fundamentality factor. The third factor, universality, was comprised of items 
suggesting a belief that homosexuality is culturally and historically invariant; no similar 
factor had been obtained in prior research on homosexuality or other social categories. 
The immutability and universality factors were correlated with positive attitudes toward 
LGs, whereas the discreteness factor was correlated with negative attitudes toward LGs. 
However, the authors acknowledged that the measure had too few items to reliably 
support claims of a 3-factor structure. The third study was conducted with a community 
sample and included an expanded 15-item measure of essentialist beliefs about sexual 
orientation generally (with some exceptions for clarity as in Hegarty and Pratto [2001]); 
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this was administered with measures of right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance 
orientation, and political conservatism. Three factors were again obtained: discreteness, 
immutability, and universality. Regression analysis indicated that the discreteness factor 
was most predictive of scores on the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
followed by right-wing authoritarianism, and then the immutability factor. Thus, 
essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation make a strong contribution to the prediction 
of antigay attitudes.  
In sum, the extant research on essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation 
suggests that essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation are significantly related to 
attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, independent of other individual differences 
previously associated with stereotyping and prejudice (e.g., social dominance orientation 
and right-wing authoritarianism). Evidence suggests that beliefs about sexual orientation, 
like beliefs about many other social categories, may fall on two factors: immutability and 
entitativity. However, recent studies finding a 3-factor structure make additional 
investigation of the structure of essentialist beliefs advisable. Researchers have been 
somewhat successful in assessing beliefs about sexual orientation broadly rather than 
focusing narrowly on beliefs about lesbians and gay men; this has important implications 
for assessing the beliefs of sexual minority individuals about sexual orientation, as will be 
discussed in a later section of this proposal. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Research on Essentialist Beliefs 
The emerging scholarship on essentialist beliefs is characterized by both strengths 
and weaknesses that may inform future work in this area. The multidisciplinary, cross-
cultural nature of the research provides a richly varied base of knowledge upon which to 
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draw. Additionally, a broad range of social categories have been the subject of study, and 
findings have largely converged on a similar two-factor structure with empirically 
supported relationship to attitudes and stereotype endorsement. The real-world 
applicability is high, with potential extension of results to education, advocacy, and 
eventually, perhaps to therapy.  
However, weaknesses in the existing empirical literature on essentialist beliefs 
also may be noted. For example, quantitative research frequently has utilized small 
samples of college students that may reflect a restricted range of essentialist beliefs or 
otherwise limit the generalizability of the findings. Furthermore, new measures typically 
have been constructed for each study that draw only partially or not at all on prior work. 
Additionally, the literature to date has focused either on the beliefs of dominant groups 
about non-dominant groups (e.g., White Americans’ beliefs about Black Americans; 
Jayaratne et al., 2006) or has failed to account for the influence of participant 
demographics on findings (e.g., Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2001). In the case of 
empirical studies investigating sexual orientation beliefs, either the sexual orientation of 
participants has not been collected or reported, or non-heterosexual participants were 
dropped from analysis (e.g., Haslam & Levy, 2007; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Jayaratne et 
al., 2006). To date, it appears that no studies examining the essentialist beliefs of non-
dominant group members about their own social category have been conducted. More 
specific to the focus of the current project, no studies were located which investigated the 
sexual orientation beliefs of lesbian, gay, or bisexual individuals.  
Recent empirical work by Kalish (2002) suggests an additional limitation of the 
literature on essentialist beliefs about social categories. The author notes that the body of 
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essentialist research tends to position lay individuals as “all-or-nothing” essentialists who 
invariably treat category membership as absolute. A series of studies conducted by 
Kalish, as well as some of the studies described in this review (e.g., Haslam, Rothschild, 
& Ernst, 2000; Hegarty & Pratto, 2004) do not support this assumption. Rather, he 
suggests that individuals may be “partial essentialists,” or exhibit an “essentialism of 
degree.” Overall, participants in Kalish’s studies assigned ratings to categories that 
indicated only a moderate degree of essentialism, and levels of essentialism varied across 
categories. While these studies examined natural kinds rather than social categories, 
similar results have been obtained in studies of essentialist beliefs about social groups 
(Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006). It is important to consider the implications of 
“partial essentialism” for individuals’ beliefs about social categories. If beliefs about 
social categories are not completely accounted for by essentialism, it seems reasonable to 
presume that there may be other sources of beliefs about social categories. Two such 
potential sources were considered for the present study. 
Alternatives to Essentialist Beliefs About Social Categories 
 The current project sought to investigate sexual minority beliefs about sexual 
orientation. The existing literature provided a foundation for an expanded exploration of 
essentialist beliefs about these social categories. Empirical research (and practical 
experience) suggests that while essentialism may account for many beliefs about social 
groups, essentialist constructs may not capture the full spectrum of popular beliefs about 
sociodemographic categories such as sexual orientation. In other words, it may be 
possible to hold sexual orientation beliefs that are not constrained by features such as 
universality, immutability, discreteness, naturalness, or informativeness. 
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 Social constructionism traditionally has been positioned as oppositional to 
essentialism in the psychological literature. To date, however, it has not been explored as 
a source of lay beliefs. A brief review of the major themes of social constructionism 
generally, and specific to discussion of sexual orientation and gender identity, is 
presented. Following this, the notable absence of personal choice and agency in 
essentialist and “strong constructionist” paradigms is considered. Beliefs emphasizing 
individual agency may be situated in a constructivist epistemology that has the potential 
to further illuminate the diversity of lay beliefs about sexual orientation and gender 
identity. 
Social Constructionism 
Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000) observed that essentialism recently has 
been of increasing popularity in the social science literature. While some increased 
attention is due to theoretical and empirical advances in the understanding of essentialist 
beliefs, the authors also noted that much of the consideration of essentialism is connected 
to critiques of theories focused on sociodemographic identity or categorization. 
Essentialist epistemologies have been criticized for claiming or emphasizing that social 
group distinctions have biological underpinnings, possess sharp boundaries, and are 
naturally occurring rather than socioculturally shaped; “this critique of essentialist 
positions is often carried out in the name of social constructivism (Haslam, Rothschild, & 
Ernst, p. 114).” 
As noted previously, the distinction between lay beliefs and psychological 
theories can be difficult to draw. Essentialist lay beliefs may simultaneously inform and 
be informed by essentialist epistemologies or disciplines, such as beliefs in a “gay gene;” 
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likewise, lay beliefs rooted in social constructionism would likely be informed by social 
constructionist theories. A key difference between essentialism and social 
constructionism, however, may be their relative popularity or accessibility. While many 
tenets of essentialism are basic and comprehensible—and in fact essentialism does not 
require that the lay individual be able to pinpoint an “essence”—tenets of social 
constructionism may be considerably more abstract. Additionally, the literatures 
supporting these two systems of ideas likely reflect the epistemological positioning of the 
theories supporting them (i.e., positivist/post-positivist vs. critical) and are therefore 
highly uneven. For example, while essentialist beliefs have been the subject of increasing 
empirical investigation, particularly of a quantitative nature, the social constructionist 
literature is largely theoretical and interrogative of “mainstream” psychological methods 
and discussion. Thus, it would be difficult to present a review of the literature on “social 
constructionist lay beliefs about sexual orientation” here, as such a literature does not 
exist per se. Rather, significant themes emerging from a review of social constructionist 
theory are highlighted and their potential translation to lay beliefs is offered. These 
themes include social constructionism’s focus on unrealness, contextuality, fluidity, 
plurality, and power. While for the purposes of this discussion social constructionism is 
presented as a singular unified theory, it bears mentioning that many different types of 
social constructionisms exist and not all social constructionists ascribe to or emphasize 
each of these themes equally. 
Un-“real”-ness. Whereas essentialism posits that social categories are 
biologically based and difficult to change, social constructionism observes that aspects of 
“reality,” including demographic categories such as sexual orientation and gender, are 
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socially constituted (Haslam & Levy, 2007). Thus, according to social constructionism, 
what an individual perceives to be real is actually an account of reality produced 
collaboratively, particularly through language (Marecek, Crawford, & Popp, 2004). As a 
result, social categories exist not because of a true underlying essence which gives rise to 
them, but because linguistic agreements have been organized around those ideas. For 
example, social constructionism postulates that there is no such thing as “homosexuality” 
in the absence of conversation about it; likewise, it would be possible to completely 
reconstruct “sexual orientation” as a category if it were collectively decided that this term 
referred to something other than the sex of one’s intimate partner(s). As but one example, 
sexual orientation could signify preferences in partner height or weight rather than sex or 
gender. Furthermore, if no language or social convention had been built around the idea 
of “sexual orientation,” the social category would not exist at all.  
Thus, language not only provides an account of how we perceive the world, but 
precedes and is constitutive of the world itself (DeLamater & Hyde, 1998). Therefore, 
social constructionist lay beliefs informed by the tenet of “unrealness” are more likely to 
observe a lack of fundamental significance to social group labels (e.g., “lesbians”) and 
are more likely to focus on the artifice of such terminology. For example, important 
recent work by Savin-Williams (2005) suggests that today’s “new gay teenagers” may 
frequently eschew self-labeling based on sexual orientation, not out of shame or 
internalized heterosexism, but because the traditional labels hold little meaning for them. 
Contextuality. Following from a rejection of an absolute reality, social 
constructionism typically foregrounds contextual variables, which may be overlooked or 
downplayed in essentialist theories. Traits and behaviors are recognized as varying across 
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settings and interactions rather than possessing a singular underlying reality. Social 
constructionism argues that essentialist beliefs falsely universalize, and in doing so foster 
stereotypic thinking. For example, Tavris (1999) notes that there is little evidence to 
support the belief that women feel more emotion than men; however, social norms related 
to the expression of emotion serve to support that idea. Lay beliefs informed by social 
constructionism therefore may move away from generalizations of group members, be 
more likely to focus on within-group differences (e.g., intersecting sociodemographic 
variables) than between-group differences, or otherwise attend to the significance of 
context. Also, because of the possibility of different social agreements and language at 
the universal and specific group levels (DeLamater & Hyde, 1998), social 
constructionism allows for the possibility of language conventions within 
subcommunities that differ from those that exist in the dominant culture. For example, 
Greene (1997) notes that the labels “gay” and “lesbian” may be perceived as thoroughly 
informed by White experiences. As a result, it has been suggested that people of color 
may use different criteria for self-labeling than White people.  
Fluidity. Social constructionism helps to break the habit of polarizing opposites, 
particularly where gender is concerned. Much writing on social constructionism is found 
in feminist scholarship and therefore is dedicated specifically to examining the way 
gender has been organized around masculine and feminine “halves.” Feminist 
psychology in particular recognizes all traits and behaviors as universally human, rather 
than as objectively “masculine” and “feminine.” Individuals may manifest different traits 
or behaviors in different situations, though socialization and oppression work to stunt the 
development of a full range of ways of being actually required for optimal health (Tavris, 
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1999). Thus, lay beliefs about gender informed by social constructionism may echo 
writings that position gender as something one does rather than something one has 
(Marecek, Crawford, & Popp, 2004). 
The concept of fluidity can be extrapolated fairly easily to sexual orientation 
beliefs as well. Essentialist belief measures typically have positioned heterosexuality and 
homosexuality as opposites, with little to no mention of bisexuality or other less 
traditional sexual minority self-labels (e.g., queer, pansexual; see Fassinger & Arseneau, 
2007). Within the sexual orientation literature, there is evidence to suggest that sexual 
minority individuals, particularly women, may endorse multiple sexual orientation self-
labels concurrently (e.g., lesbian and bisexual), and that sexuality may be perceived as 
fluid and changing over time (Rust, 2000). Tavris (1999) nicely captures this distinction 
made by social constructionism in noting, “essentialism confuses snapshots with 
blueprints (p. 5).” Thus, while essentialist beliefs focus on the fixity of sexual orientation, 
social constructionist beliefs are likely to focus on fluidity and discontinuity.  
Plurality. Social constructionism takes issue with the very idea that social 
categorization represents any core aspect of individual identity. Where essentialism 
locates attributes completely or mostly within the individual, social constructionism often 
locates that attribute in the social interactions of that individual. For example, Bohan 
(1993) provides the useful example that an essentialist attribution may be that a given 
person is “friendly,” while a social constructionist attribution might be that a particular 
conversation that same individual has with another person is “friendly.” Strong social 
constructionism views the individual and social group as indissoluble (Marecek, 
Crawford, & Popp, 2004). To that end, some social constructionists prefer not to use the 
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word “self” because they consider it a fallacy. 
By extension, social constructionist beliefs about sexual orientation would likely 
eschew the use of this social identity to provide meaningful information about an 
individual. If sexual orientation exists outside the self (or if the self does not even exist), 
then sexual orientation labels would be more appropriately applied to relationships (e.g., 
“a same-gender partnership”) rather than individuals (e.g., “a bisexual man”). This stands 
in contrast to essentialist beliefs that describe social categories as “informative” about the 
individual group member. 
Focus on power. Significantly, social constructionism attends to issues of power 
and hierarchy. This emanates from the view that shared constructions frequently become 
institutionalized to the benefit of some and detriment to others (DeLamater & Hyde, 
1998). Thus, social constructionist inquiry about a given construct (e.g., “sexuality”), 
frequently attends to an articulation of whose accounts are marginalized or subjugated, 
and whose are dominant, within that literature (Marecek, Crawford, & Popp, 2004). 
Furthermore, social constructionism focuses on the material differences that often result 
from these constructed power differentials. For example, Landrine (1998) noted that the 
cultural constructions of gender perpetuate and validate the existing social hierarchy 
favoring men; this translates concretely into wage differences between men and women, 
as but one example.  
In contrast with social constructionism, essentialist beliefs conflate social 
categorization with circumstance, and tend to naturalize historical or social conditions. 
Mahalingam and Rodriguez (2003) observed that “power differentials and social 
hierarchy influence our beliefs about gender (p.160, emphasis added),” and result in the 
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attribution of essential psychological characteristics to women, such as nurturing and 
cooperativeness, that are institutionally devalued and disempowered. Tavris (1999) 
further cited evidence suggesting that many reported gender differences would all but 
disappear if relative social power were controlled for; this brings her to observe that 
purported (and popularly disseminated) “women’s ways of knowing” are, in reality, the 
ways of knowing of the powerless. 
Social constructionist beliefs about demographic categories would likely 
acknowledge that social power is not equally split between groups, nor among group 
members. Thus, a sexual minority orientation would be recognized as less socially 
powerful than heterosexuality. Lay social constructionist beliefs might also stipulate 
intra-group differences in power within the LGB community based on sexual orientation 
(e.g., lesbians have less power than gay men, bisexual men and women have less power 
than lesbians). As another example, while lay essentialist beliefs might dictate that same-
sex couples will less frequently be involved in childrearing because of the biological 
“incompatibility” of reproduction and homosexuality, social constructionist lay beliefs 
might interrogate the socially prescribed roles dictating that a child is optimally raised in 
a two-parent, other-sex household, and the power that this confers upon heterosexuals. 
Weak social constructionism as essentialism. A final point to be made about 
social constructionism relates to the distinction between those who claim that social 
constructionism is concerned with the social causes of difference (“weak social 
constructionists;” e.g., cultural or difference feminism) and those who argue that such 
supposed differences are themselves social constructions (“strong social 
constructionists”). Many (e.g., Bohan, 1993; DeLamater & Hyde, 1998; Kitzinger, 1995; 
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Tavris, 1999) have noted that what sometimes passes for social constructionism is 
actually better understood as a social essentialism. Indeed, Tavris (1999) argues that the 
primary difference between essentialism and social constructionism is not that 
essentialists believe the basis of an individual’s gender is biological and social 
constructionists think it is social. Rather, she states that social constructionism contends 
that “there is no essence of masculinity and femininity” (p. 6). Strong social 
constructionism re-locates gender outside of the individual altogether and recognizes it as 
a product of social conventions and agreements that resides in the interactions individuals 
have with one another. For some, this means gender exists outside the body; others have 
claimed that social constructionists do not have to “deny that genes, hormones, and brain 
physiology may have effects on behavior and morphology. However, their interest lies in 
the accounts that people give about sexual bodies” (Marecek, Crawford, & Popp, 2004, p. 
205). 
For the purposes of the current project, “weak” social constructionist beliefs were 
conceptualized as essentialist beliefs. Theories that emphasize rather than diminish 
differences between groups—even if the differences are claimed to be socially rather than 
biologically produced—serve to reinforce beliefs that differences are deep-seated, 
develop early, and give rise to features that are persistent over time. These characteristics 
are all core features of essentialism. 
Finally, Kitzinger (1995) argues that essentialism includes a primary belief that 
things are knowable; as a result essentialism is easily amenable to the pursuit of scientific 
evidence against which theories can be judged. The strongest forms of social 
constructionism defy both of these characteristics. According to these theorists, social 
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science itself is a construction. Clearly, this is not—and cannot be—the position of the 
current project. Rather, the present study sought to explore the potential social 
constructionist beliefs that individuals hold about sexual orientation in a manner 
equivalent to and methodologically built upon the preexisting exploration of lay 
essentialist beliefs. 
Summary. Social constructionism posits that social categories are, in the words of 
Hansell (2000), “fictive, contingent, performative” (p. 772). Several social constructionist 
themes with potential applicability to lay beliefs about sexual orientation and gender 
identity have been presented in this section. These themes describe the process of 
creating and reinforcing social groupings as characterized by unrealness, contextuality, 
fluidity, plurality, and a focus on power. 
While social constructionism often has taken essentialism as its subject, it bears 
noting that the objective here is not to establish that social constructionism is “right” and 
essentialism is “wrong.” Indeed, social constructionism has many of its own criticisms, 
not the least of which is that social constructionism, in being positioned so frequently and 
so strongly in opposition to essentialism, runs the risk of becoming established as its 
opposite pole in a new (essential) dichotomy (Hansell, 2000). Lyddon (1998) further 
offers an excellent critique that the social constructionist lens is rarely used by social 
constructionists to deconstruct social constructionism itself, implicitly (or purposefully) 
affording it a similar “privileged” status to the one it seeks to dismantle in other theories. 
The Role of Agency 
 Essentialism dictates that social categories are natural, fixed, and give rise to 
important characteristics in individual group members. Social constructionism argues that 
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social categories are neither real nor individually based and possess no core “essence.” 
While these particular epistemologies allow for an abundance of lay ontological 
assumptions about social groups, for the purposes of the present study it was important to 
consider whether other popular beliefs about sexual orientation might exist outside of 
these two categories.  
In public debate about the etiology of homosexuality, there typically have been 
two predominant viewpoints, often presented as mutually exclusive and oppositional: 
sexual orientation is either inborn, or it is a choice. Though the political ramifications of 
both of these views have changed over time, presently, arguments in favor of a biological 
basis for sexual orientation commonly are advanced by advocates and allies. Conversely, 
the idea that sexual orientation is an individual choice (possibly reflecting a person’s very 
morality) tends to be claimed by those who would oppose civil rights for—and the 
“normalizing” of—sexual minority individuals, couples, and families (Jayaratne et al., 
2006). Currently, personal choice in sexual orientation frequently is emphasized by 
organizations created expressly to support an individual’s right to choose to be 
heterosexual, such as so-called “ex-gay” groups (for an example, see PATH, “Change is 
possible”). Thus, the idea that individuals have a choice about sexual orientation group 
membership could easily be considered a lay belief—and a fairly common one at that—
about these social identities.  
However, neither essentialist nor social constructionist theories truly account for 
an agentic lay theory of sexual orientation. Essentialist beliefs would seemingly reject the 
possibility of choice in social group membership, as membership is driven by a 
fundamental essence, and therefore would be difficult to change regardless of any 
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personal preference. Social constructionism does not directly reject the notion of choice 
in social group membership; however, it typically seeks to deconstruct the legitimacy of 
the social category itself. Social constructionism locates the origin of sociodemographic 
groups in social exchange, with only indirect comment on individual capacities for 
choosing or rejecting membership in these categories. For example, the social 
constructionist theme of “fluidity” described above allows for discontinuity and 
multiplicity in sexual orientation endorsement, which appears to leave room for personal 
choice without explicitly foregrounding the role of agency. Thus, despite the fact that 
agentic capacity is not well accommodated by essentialism or social constructionism, 
consideration of the claimed existence of choice was deemed important for this study, 
given its centrality in popular discussions of sexuality. Were this study to have 
investigated lay beliefs about a different social grouping with a disparate social discourse 
(for example, race), attention to agency may not have been as vital. Nevertheless, because 
the purpose of this project was in part to expand the previous examination of lay beliefs 
about sexual orientation beyond essentialism, it was determined that agentic beliefs 
would be incorporated as a third possible type of belief about sexuality. 
Beliefs about individual choice in sexual orientation could be construed as 
positioned within a constructivist epistemology. Though cognitive constructivism was 
originally presented as a theory of learning and development, more recently, 
constructivist approaches have been found in the counseling psychology literature, 
particularly as related to vocational psychology (Fouad, 2007). Constructivism holds that 
realty is constructed within the mind of the individual; thus, neither is there one objective 
reality, nor is reality solely a construction based on social agreement (Martin & 
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Sugarman, 1997). Unlike strong social constructionist readings, constructivist viewpoints 
specifically center the role of the individual in building her or his own lived experience, 
and highlight the ongoing possibility of personal agency across one’s life. Indeed, just as 
social constructionism is frequently offered as a response to essentialism, constructivist 
views defy a strong social constructionist argument that reality exists only as a function 
of social convention. To this point, Martin and Sugarman noted: 
The power of social and linguistic structures and conventions derives not from 
their manipulation of passive human organisms, but from their use by human 
agents who actively adopt and interpret them in light of their own lives and 
circumstances (p. 376). 
Thus, constructivist psychologists focus on a subjective reality that includes social input 
but foregrounds individual choice, agency, and interpretation. 
Likewise, agentic beliefs about sexual orientation may be tied to a social 
cognitive theory of agency advanced by Bandura (1989; 2001; 2006). According to this 
theory, human agency consists of four core properties: intentionality, forethought, self-
reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness. Intentionality is comprised of a plan of action or 
strategy for realizing an identified self-interest. Forethought refers to people’s ability to 
anticipate a variety of possible outcomes of prospective actions, and to use these to guide 
and motivate their efforts. The third agentic property, self-reactiveness, relates to the 
individual’s ability to self-motivate and regulate execution of action plans derived from 
intentionality and forethought. Finally, self-reflectiveness is a metacognitive process by 
which individuals use self-awareness to reflect upon their actions, thoughts, intentions, 
outcomes, and “the meaning of their pursuits” (p. 165). In his description of agentic 
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capacity, Bandura notes that there is no complete agency; all beings operate in social 
environments which provide both influences and restraints. However, he also notes that 
“the capacity to exercise control over the nature and quality of one’s life is the essence of 
humanness” (2001, p. 1). Thus, the author acknowledges the power and import of the 
social milieu, as do social constructionists, but he argues that these take a back seat to the 
individual’s ability to prefer, plan, choose, and be. 
In his articulations of an agentic perspective, Bandura (2006) also attends to what 
he terms an extensive “genetization” of human behavior, and the increasing pull to reduce 
all human action to biological predisposition. This is particularly applicable to 
discussions of sexual orientation and preoccupation with the possibility of a “gay gene.” 
In responding to this tendency toward genetization, he distinguishes between biological 
determinism and biological potentialism: 
Biological determinists support a conservative view of society that emphasizes the 
rule of nature, inherent constraints, and limitations. … Biological 
potentialists…emphasize human possibilities and how to realize them. People 
have changed little genetically over the past millennium, but they have changed 
markedly in their beliefs, mores, social and occupational roles, cohabitating 
arrangements, family practices, and styles of behavior in diverse spheres of life 
(p. 173). 
Thus, an agentic theory of social group membership need not disregard or dismiss the 
possibility of biological contributions. However, the potentialist nature of the theory 
foregrounds choice over evolution or genetics, in much the same way that it foregrounds 
choice over social or environmental influence. 
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The attention to the role of personal choice in popular discussion of sexual 
orientation is apparent. The work on essentialist beliefs conducted by Demoulin and 
colleagues (2006), which examined forced versus chosen social categories, provides 
further support for the potential significance of choice in discussions of category 
membership. While the authors framed their research in terms of essentialist theory, it is 
arguable whether chosen social groups are essential groups, according to the basic tenets 
of psychological essentialism. Nevertheless, at least one prior study examining beliefs 
about social groups has considered the contributing effect of perceived choice in category 
membership, though this study did not consider sexual orientation among its categories. 
For the purposes of the present study, agentic beliefs about sexual orientation were 
considered in addition to essentialist and social constructionist beliefs about this 
sociodemographic category. 
Summary and Statement of the Problem 
Over the past decade, a literature has emerged which focuses on the lay 
essentialist beliefs that individual adults hold about social groups. Some of the empirical 
work in this domain has sought to compare the nature and structure of lay essentialist 
beliefs across social groups; other work has focused exclusively on essentialist beliefs 
about a single social identity category, as in the case of sexual orientation. 
The extant literature provided a solid basis for the continued investigation of 
essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation. Measures of essentialist beliefs used in 
previous research have been fairly abbreviated and may not have explored fully the range 
of theoretical constructs that undergird psychological essentialism. Furthermore, these 
measures typically have been administered to a heterosexual population, leaving 
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essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation held by sexual minorities people 
uninvestigated. The present study was designed to begin addressing the lack of attention 
to non-dominant group members’ lay beliefs in the current essentialist literature.  
Additionally, the existing research on lay beliefs about sexual orientation 
examines essentialist attributions in the absence of any other type of meaning-making, at 
least explicitly. Though one study (Demoulin et al., 2006) did acknowledge that 
perceived choice in group membership may lead to different outcomes, the authors failed 
to comment on whether this may reflect a non-essentialist (or at least, differently 
essentialist) belief structure. Given popular and sexual minority community-based 
discussions about the nature of sexual orientation, and the very real consequences that 
may emanate from advocacy and policy work related to these conversations (i.e., civil 
rights), the case could be made for studying essentialist beliefs in the presence of other 
lay theories. 
Thus, the present study had as its focus the creation and initial validation of a 
measure of sexual orientation and beliefs that expands upon prior empirical work in two 
distinct ways. First, the project identified a population of interest (i.e., the LGB 
community) that has not been the focus of previous study in this domain. This 
represented an expansion of the existing literature in that the lay beliefs of sexual 
minority people had not been a focus of prior study. Moreover, the essentialist literature 
generally has examined the beliefs of dominant populations much more frequently than 
non-dominant populations (e.g., White people’s beliefs about race). Mahalingam (2003) 
argued that it is important for research in this domain to study populations that implicitly 
reject essentialist views through transgression. It was hoped that this study might begin to 
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move the study of essentialist beliefs in that direction. Furthermore, the current study 
explored possible sources of lay beliefs not rooted in essentialism that were not (or were 
not explicitly) examined in the preexisting literature; specifically, beliefs rooted in social 
constructionism and a focus on individual agentic capacity. 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
The preceding review of the literature outlined the existing base of empirical 
knowledge about lay essentialist beliefs. This growing body of scholarship provided a 
foundation for the present study. No prior empirical literature existed regarding lay 
beliefs about social categories that may stem from non-essentialist standpoints, such as 
beliefs about agency in sexual orientation identification, or beliefs rooted in social 
constructionism. As such, formal hypotheses were most readily offered for the 
essentialist beliefs included within this expanded measure, the Sexual Orientation Beliefs 
Scale (SOBS). The SOBS was conceptualized as a single, unified measure of beliefs 
about sexual orientation, which was expected to consist of subscales at the level of the 
factors produced in analysis. Scale scores were expected to be at the level of the subscale. 
Given the lack of prior empirical research on beliefs about sexual orientation in a sexual 
minority population, as well as the lack of research on social constructionist and agentic 
beliefs, it was difficult to reasonably hypothesize patterns of responses on the social 
constructionist or agentic items included in the new measure. Therefore, the behavior of 
social constructionist and agentic items within the SOBS was initially the focus of 
research questions rather than formal hypotheses. However, after extensive conversation 
with members of the examination committee at the time of the proposal, it was 
determined that formal hypotheses were more suitable to the present project and thus 
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additional hypotheses about the non-essentialist belief items were articulated. The 
hypotheses and research questions that eventually guided the present inquiry are outlined 
below.  
The current study examined the following hypotheses: 
Reliability 
Hypothesis 1: A Sexual Orientation Beliefs Scale (SOBS) can be created that will 
produce adequate estimates of internal consistency reliability as measured by Cronbach’s 
alpha at the levels of the individual subscales. 
Factor Structure 
Hypothesis 2: The SOBS will be a unified but multidimensional measure 
comprised of essentialist, social constructionist, and agentic beliefs about sexual 
orientation.  
The pre-existing work on essentialist beliefs about social groups has largely 
supported the idea that such beliefs are comprised of two distinct factors (e.g., Haslam, 
Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Hegarty & Pratto, 
2001). Though variously named, these factors share basic features and can be understood 
as reflecting the domains of natural kindness and entitativity. While a recent study 
(Haslam & Levy, 2007) did obtain a three-factor structure, this finding represents an 
anomaly within the literature to date. The present project sought to extend the pre-
existing literature and included social constructionist and agentic beliefs. No prior 
empirical study of such beliefs was located, and as such there was no basis for 
hypothesizing a factor structure of these beliefs. Thus, it was hypothesized that the SOBS 
would reveal multiple factors reflecting a unified, multidimensional construct. 
43 
Exploratory Research Questions 
This study also investigated the following research questions: 
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between beliefs about sexual 
orientation and right-wing authoritarianism? 
Right wing authoritarianism, as conceptualized and measured by Altemeyer 
(2006) in a series of studies spanning over two decades, is a personality style 
characterized by a high degree of submission to the established authorities in one’s 
society, high levels of aggression in the name of that authority, and a high level of 
conventionalism. Right wing authoritarianism has been shown to correlate with political 
conservatism, racial-ethnic prejudice, sexism, heterosexism, and a host of other 
prejudicial attitudes; essentialist beliefs have likewise been correlated with prejudicial 
attitudes and stereotype endorsement. 
In previous research, conservatism, authoritarianism, and fundamentalism have 
been demonstrated to correlate (Herek, 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994). Furthermore, each of these constructs has been empirically linked to attitudes 
about homosexuality (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Pratto et al.). In their study, Bastian and 
Haslam examined the relationship between essentialist beliefs, several individual 
difference factors including right-wing authoritarianism, and stereotype endorsement. 
They found that essentialist beliefs were most predictive of stereotype endorsement. 
Among the individual difference scales only right-wing authoritarianism independently 
and significantly made a unique predictive contribution. Given mounting evidence 
suggesting a relationship between essentialist beliefs and attitudes about social groups 
(Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000), and the well-established connection between RWA 
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and attitudes about social groups (Altemeyer, 2006), it is important to explore the 
relationship between this new measure of sexual orientation beliefs and an established 
measure of authoritarianism.  
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between beliefs about sexual 
orientation and need for cognitive structure? 
In a recent study, Bastian and Haslam (2006) found that the level of endorsement 
of essentialist beliefs (the “essentialist index”) was the single largest predictor of 
endorsement of stereotypes about social groups. Several other individual difference 
constructs previously hypothesized as relating to stereotyping, including the need for 
cognitive closure, did not add any predictive power over and above essentialism; 
however, results of the relationship between essentialist beliefs and need for cognitive 
closure in this study were unreported. The need for structure has been argued to be 
conceptually undistinguishable from the need for closure (Neuberg, Judice, & West, 
1997). The need for structure, measured by the Personal Need for Structure scale (PNS; 
Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1989), has been defined by Neuberg and Newsom 
(1993) as an individual’s use of abstract and overgeneralized representations, such as 
stereotypes, as a way of managing cognitive load. Because the need for structure thereby 
focuses on an individual’s propensity toward attending to the information in an efficient 
and simplified manner, it would seem to be similar in function to adherence to essentialist 
beliefs, which provide clear-cut and cognitively simple ontological explanations for 
social groups. Social constructionism, on the other hand, is a collection of arguably 
abstract themes that challenge representations of what is “real” (DeLamater & Hyde, 
1998). Social constructionist themes tend to be expansive rather than reductive, and work 
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against efforts to reduce cognitive load by stereotyping. In other words, it is argued here 
that essentialist beliefs may tend toward simple or stereotypic, while social 
constructionist beliefs may tend to be higher in cognitive complexity. Thus, the 
relationship between beliefs about sexual orientation and the need for structure are the 
focus of a research question in the present study. 
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between beliefs about sexual 
orientation and collective self esteem? 
Prior research on essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation has found that these 
beliefs are predictive of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (Haslam & Levy, 2007). 
Specifically, high levels of endorsement of immutability beliefs (e.g., a biological basis 
of sexuality) have been found to be associated with more positive attitudes toward gay 
men and lesbians, whereas high levels of endorsement of entitativity beliefs have been 
found to be associated with more negative attitudes about gay men and lesbians. One of 
the instruments most frequently used to assess heterosexuals’ attitudes about sexual 
minority people is Herek’s (1994) Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG) 
scale (Worthington, Dillon, & Becker-Shutte, 2005). Review of this instrument reveals 
that it may not be appropriate for use with a non-heterosexual sample population, as 
many of the items convey an explicit or implicit out-group orientation. For example, 
there may be a restricted range of responses to the item “lesbians are sick” among LGBT 
respondents. Thus, the utility of this measure is potentially diminished in the present 
study. Furthermore, recognizing that research is an intervention in participants’ lives, it is 
crucial to consider the potential impact upon respondents of a measure containing 
multiple, overtly homonegative items such as “male homosexuality is a perversion.” 
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Nevertheless, the prior research on essentialist beliefs establishes a significant and 
compelling link between beliefs about social categories and attitudes. The current project, 
however, required a measure that would effectively assess introjected attitudes, that is, 
attitudes that sexual minority individuals hold about sexual minority people, identities, 
and communities. Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) 
has been utilized with a variety of populations, including minority populations, to assess 
such attitudes (Utsey & Constantine, 2006). Thus, relationships between the SOBS and 
the CSES were explored in the present study.  
Research Question 4: What is the relationship between demographic variables of 





The present study drew from prior empirical and theoretical work on essentialist 
beliefs about social groups in order to create an expanded measure of lay beliefs about 
sexual orientation, while also integrating additional key concepts from the theoretical 
work on social constructionism as well as popular attention to individual choice. The 
project was further designed to examine these beliefs in a sample of sexual minority 
people, as previous work on beliefs about social groups has tended to rather narrowly 
address majority group members’ beliefs about non-dominant groups. In this chapter, 
information on participants and procedures from the current study is provided. This 
information is offered in two parts. The first section details the procedures, including a 
pilot study, utilized in development of the scale that was tested in the main study. The 
second section outlines the main study itself, in which hypotheses were tested and 
research questions were explored.  
Part I: Initial Scale Development 
The first phase of this project involved the design of a prospective measure of 
sexual orientation beliefs. Best practices in and recommendations for scale development 
in counseling psychology (e.g., Dawis, 1987; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006) guided 
this portion of the project. 
Preliminary Item Construction 
A research team of eight graduate students conducting sexual minority research 
and conversant in issues related to the psychology of sexuality participated in the initial 
item construction process intended to form the foundation of a Sexual Orientation Beliefs 
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Scale (SOBS). Several members of the team additionally were versed in other topics of 
relevance to the current project, such as cultural studies, survey design, religious studies, 
and policy/advocacy. Team members were diverse in terms of their own sexual 
orientation self-labeling, and collectively represented lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and 
straight identifications. 
For the first phase of item generation, team members were asked to brainstorm 
individual lists of “beliefs about sexual orientation” that they or others may hold. These 
individual lists of beliefs were then discussed as a group and a master list was prepared. 
Redundant items were deleted and supplemental items that emerged through discussion 
were added. Subsequently, team members were informed of the major themes described 
in the preceding review of the literature which were identified as being of particular 
relevance to the present study. Specifically, the themes presented to the research team 
included: the essentialist domains of discreteness, uniformity, informativeness, 
naturalness, immutability, stability, inherence, necessity, and exclusivity; the social 
constructionist domains labeled by this investigator as unrealness, contextuality, fluidity, 
plurality, and focus on power; and the domain of individual agency, characterized by 
personal choice and self-construction. Team members were asked to generate any 
additional beliefs they or others might hold about sexual orientation that were rooted in 
these themes. Approximately twenty beliefs were articulated through this team process. 
In the second phase of item generation, this researcher re-wrote the beliefs 
produced by the research team as prospective items on a fully-anchored, 5-point, Likert-
type scale ranging from “1 = strongly disagree” to “5 = strongly agree” (following 
Haslam & Levy, 2007). Additional items were subsequently generated in order to attempt 
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to ensure that each domain area of the construct was fully tapped, consistent with 
recommendations for maximizing content validity (Hoyt, Warbasse, & Chu, 2006). 
Finally, relevant items utilized in previous measures of essentialist beliefs were reviewed 
for potential applicability to the present measure (see Appendix A). Some of these 
formed the basis for new potential items for the SOBS, after being revised for clarity and 
content. A total of 84 items were produced through this process for expert review (see 
Appendix B for the initial pool of items provided to experts).  
Subsequently, three advanced graduate students in counseling/clinical psychology 
and two counseling psychologists known to the researcher with knowledge of sexual 
minority issues were solicited to serve as expert auditors of these initial items. These 
experts were all female, heterosexual or straight identified, and White/Caucasian. The 
experts were charged with two primary tasks. First, they were asked to review the pool of 
items for maximally inclusive language, clarity, and phrasing. Secondly, experts were 
asked to consider whether the individual items reflected the intended domain areas (e.g., 
inherence, focused on power, agency) based on brief definitions of these terms 
synthesized from the preceding review of the literature and provided to them. Consistent 
with the recommendations for scale development, reviewers were also invited to submit 
additional items reflecting beliefs about sexual orientation that they thought were not well 
reflected in the pool of prospective items in order to improve construct validity (Anastasi, 
1998). Reviewers provided extensive feedback which was subsequently integrated by this 
researcher with the assistance of the faculty advisor. Items which were deemed by the 
experts to be confusing or unclear, double-barreled, or unrepresentative of the appropriate 
domain were altered or omitted. Suggestions for new items were also taken into account. 
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The expert vetting process ultimately yielded a total of 91 items assessing beliefs about 
sexual orientation for the pilot study (see Appendix C for the list of piloted items).    
Pilot Study 
Prior to formal data collection, a small pilot study (N = 17) was conducted. A 
pilot measure consisting of the 91 prospective items arranged in random order was 
administered to participants via a secured Internet site (i.e., SurveyMonkey). Pilot 
participants included sexual minority individuals known to the researcher who were 
solicited by email for the purpose of the pilot study. In order to both increase the number 
of pilot participants and to decrease the likelihood that participants would be easily 
identifiable based on their responses, solicited individuals were asked to share the pilot 
invitation with one other sexual minority person known to them. The pilot study 
consisted of the demographic questionnaire planned for use for in the main study (see 
Appendix D), the pilot version of the Sexual Orientation Beliefs Scale, and the measures 
planned for use in the main study for establishing concurrent, discriminant, and predictive 
validity (i.e., Personal Need for Structure scale; Right Wing Authoritarianism scale, and 
the Collective Self Esteem Scale). These latter validity measures were included in the 
pilot simply to gauge the amount of time required to complete the survey in its entirety, 
and pilot participants were asked to track the amount of time required to complete various 
sections of the survey. This information would later be used to determine whether 
retaining all of the prospective measures would be feasible in the main study. Pilot 
participants were also provided an opportunity at the end of the measure to offer feedback 
to this researcher about any and all parts of the survey.  
Pilot participants included 11 women and 6 men, none of whom identified as 
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transgender. Participants ranged in age from 22 to 56 ( x  = 32.4, sd = 8.5). Four pilot 
participants (three women and one man) identified as bisexual, three men identified as 
gay, seven women identified as lesbians, one man identified as queer, and two individuals 
(one woman and one man) identified as “other” (i.e., “queer hetero” and “mostly 
hetero”). Thirteen participants identified as White/Caucasian, three participants identified 
as Hispanic/Latino/Chicano and one participant identified as East Asian American. Pilot 
participants on the whole were highly educated, with five individuals reporting their 
highest level of education as a doctoral degree, five reporting a master’s degree, one 
reporting some graduate/professional schooling, one reporting a bachelor’s degree, and 
one reporting some undergraduate schooling. Pilot participants were predominantly urban 
(n = 10), with six living in a suburban area and one living in a rural area. These 
individuals lived in the Southeast (n = 7), Northeast (n = 5), Midwest (n = 4) and West 
(n = 1) of the United States. Respondents reported their self perceived socioeconomic 
status using a variation on the MacArthur Subjective Status Scale (SSS; Adler, Epel, 
Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). The SSS allows participants to rank their relative social 
status on a 10-point scale where “1 = lowest” and “10 = highest.” Members of this study 
sample reported social status ranging from 4 to 10 ( x  = 6.6, sd = 1.6). 
Based on a review of the responses obtained in the pilot study (e.g., mean scores, 
score ranges, and standard deviations), as well as feedback offered by pilot participants, 
the final items for inclusion in the validation study of the Sexual Orientation Beliefs scale 
were selected. One of the most significant decisions that emerged as a result of the pilot 
study was to change the wording of items so that all items in the prospective scale were 
positively valenced. This decision was made for multiple reasons. The first is that 
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feedback suggested that in some places the prospective measure felt highly redundant. 
When this was explored more specifically, it was noted that some statements written as 
positive items for one category were similar to reverse-coded items in other categories. 
For example, the pilot items “Sexual orientation can change over time” and “A person’s 
sexual orientation cannot change” were originally written to address two separate 
constructs (i.e., social constructionist fluidity and essentialist immutability, respectively). 
However, in reviewing the scoring of the pilot data, it became clear that it could equally 
be argued that these items should be treated as inversely coded items tapping the same 
construct. Rather than make presumptive assumptions about the actual relationship 
between these constructs, such as that they represent oppositional beliefs, it was 
determined that using positively valenced items only in the main study would better 
allow such relationships to emerge during data analysis. Thus, items were altered 
following the pilot study so that high levels of endorsement of an item in the main study 
would uniformly reflect high levels of endorsement of the related construct. Therefore, 
level of agreement with the item, “A person’s sexual orientation cannot change” would 
be scored as endorsement of immutability. No reverse coded items were used in the main 
study. As a result of this decision, statistical analyses on pilot data were confined to the 
descriptive statistics already noted. 
Additionally, based on feedback from pilot participants, this researcher and the 
faculty advisor engaged in a conversation about some items that could be construed as 
highly negative by participants in the main study. Because this researcher subscribes to a 
belief that research is an intervention (Ponterotto, 2005), prospective items that could be 
viewed as reinforcing of negative stereotypes or otherwise assaultive of participants’ 
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sexual minority identities were closely examined and either revised or discarded. For 
example, the pilot item, “Particularly difficult or traumatic experiences may cause a 
change in an individual's sexual orientation,” while potentially reflective of commonly 
held beliefs, is deeply rooted in a problematic homonegativity that links same-gender 
attraction to unhealthy situations or abnormal development. It was determined that items 
reinforcing of historically harmful belief structures, while perhaps consistent with the 
letter of this project, were not in keeping with the spirit of the study as envisioned by this 
researcher and the faculty advisor. As a result of the pilot testing, the number of items in 
the emerging Sexual Orientation Belief Scale was reduced by 20, from 91 to 71 items. 
Finally, pilot data suggested that the amount of time required for completion of 
the full survey ranged from 12 minutes to 45 minutes ( x  = 27.7, sd = 11.1). One 
participant provided feedback that her time of 45 minutes was partially due to a reading 
disability, and she cautioned the researchers not to “be alarmed” by this amount of time, 
as she typically plans for extra time in tasks such as these. It was determined that the time 
required to complete the series of measures was not unreasonable, and also would be 
reduced slightly by the deletion of 20 items on the prospective measure. Thus, the 
decision was made to retain all measures planned for use in exploring the validity of the 
SOBS. 
Part II: Hypothesis Testing and Exploration of Research Questions 
 This section outlines the procedures utilized in the main study, as well as 
instrumentation and analyses conducted. It further describes the sample of individuals 




 Participants in this study were sexual minority adults; that is, individuals who 
self-identify as same-gender attracted or oriented (e.g., lesbians, gay men, bisexual men 
and women) who may or may not also be gender nonconforming (e.g., transsexual, 
transgender). While an attraction to or orientation toward same-gender individuals was 
listed as a criterion for participation in the study, individuals whose sexual orientation 
self-labeling may have been other than lesbian, gay or bisexual—for example, individuals 
who self-identify as pansexual, queer, bi-curious, or questioning—were explicitly 
recruited and included in the pool of participants.  
A total of 804 individuals consented to participate in the survey. Respondents 
who failed to complete at least 75% of the total survey (i.e., demographics form, 
prospective Sexual Orientation Beliefs Scale, and the validity measures) were removed 
from the sample (N =151, or 18.8% of initial participant pool), yielding 653 data sets for 
analysis.  
Given the large number of participants who responded to the study and met 
criteria for inclusion, the feasibility of splitting the data set was considered. 
Recommendations for determining the minimum sample size necessary for exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) vary. One common guideline suggests that absolute sample size of 
300 or more is typically sufficient for EFA (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Another 
frequently cited rule suggests that a 5:1 participant-item ratio represents a sufficient 
sample size for EFA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), which in the case of this preliminary 
measure consisting of 71 items, would suggest a minimum sample size of 355 
participants. Interestingly, however, in their recent content analysis of scale development 
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studies appearing in the Journal of Counseling Psychology, Worthington and Whittaker 
(2006) found participant-item ratios varying from 2:1 to 35:1, with a modal ratio of 3:1. 
Tinsley and Tinsley (1987) suggested that the participant-item ratio becomes less 
essential with increasing sample sizes, and noted that the ratio guidelines become less 
essential in samples larger than 300. Thus, the decision was made to randomly split the 
data set into two portions, expecting that half of the collected data would provide an 
adequate pool for EFA and other anticipated analyses. The first portion of the data set (N 
= 332) was utilized for the EFA and all other analyses conducted in the present 
investigation (henceforth referred to as the study sample). This sample size was in excess 
of the generally suggested 300 participants and approached a 5:1 participant-item ratio 
(specifically, it represented a 4.5:1 ratio). The remaining portion of the dataset (N = 321) 
was reserved for further work on this instrument in the future. Unless otherwise noted, all 
percentages provided in the description of participants below refer back to the total study 
sample of 332 individuals. 
Demographics of the study sample are provided in Table 1. Of the 322 
participants, 200 (60.2%) indicated they were born female or assigned female gender at 
birth, and 132 (39.8%) indicated they were born male or assigned male gender at birth. 
Twenty-six individuals (7.8%) indicated that they were transgender or presently living a 
gender other than the one assigned at birth. Of these participants, 19 (5.7%) were 
genetically female and seven (2.1%) were genetically male. Transgender or gender 
nontraditional participants were provided the opportunity to self-label their gender 
identity in the study; the 16 individual responses given varied greatly, with 
“genderqueer” being the most popular and representing 7 participants (2.1% of the study 
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sample). While these data are challenging to report in a manner that is simultaneously 
accurate and concise, they reveal how many individuals may be inaccurately or 
incompletely labeled using the more traditional method of indicating gender on a 
demographic form (e.g., 1 = male, 2 = female).  
Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of Study Sample (N = 332) 
 
Characteristic n % 
 
Gender assigned at birth 
 Female 200 60.2 
  Transgender 19 5.7 
  Non-transgender 181 56.2 
 Male 132 39.8 
  Transgender 7 2.1 
  Non-transgender 125 37.7 
Sexual orientation 
 Bisexual 55 16.6 
 Gay 113 34.0 
 Lesbian 104 31.3 
 Queer 43 13.0 
 Questioning/Uncertain 7 2.1 




 18-24 100 30.1 
 25-34 91 27.4 
 35-44 53 16.0 
 45-54 43 13.0 
55-64 33 9.9  
65-74 12 3.6 
Race 
 African American/Black 15 4.5  
 East/South Asian American 11 3.3 
 American Indian/Native American 3 0.9  
 Biracial/Multiracial 12 3.6 
 Hispanic/Latino 21 6.3   
 White/Caucasian 252 78.9 
 Other/Refused 8 2.4 
Highest education level 
 High school/GED 5 1.5 
 Some college 70 21.1 
 Associate or technical degree 10 3.0 
Undergraduate degree 54 16.3 
 Some graduate/professional school 30 9.0 
 Master’s degree 88 26.5 
Doctoral degree 74 22.3 
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Geographic location 
 Rural area 33 9.9 
 Suburban area 112 3.7 
 Urban area 179 53.9 
 Other 8 2.4 
Region 
 Canada 4 1.2 
 Puerto Rico 1 0.3 
 United States: 
  Midwest 100 30.1 
Northeast 85 25.6 
  Southeast 80 24.1  
  Southwest 16 4.8 
West 46 13.9 
Subjective social status (lowest to highest) 
 1 1 0.3 
 2 1 0.3 
 3 13 3.9 
 4 29 8.7 
 5 56 16.9 
 6 65 19.6 
 7 85 25.6 
 8 62 18.7 
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 9 17 5.1 
 10 3 0.9 
 
Likewise, sexual orientation data provided by this sample were both rich and 
complex. Respondents were asked to choose one sexual orientation label from a list of 6 
options consisting of bisexual, gay, lesbian, queer, questioning/uncertain, and other. 
Individuals who selected “other” had the opportunity to type in their own label. 
(Participants were also invited to separately indicate the word(s) they typically use to 
self-label their sexuality; however, responses to that item were not analyzed for the 
present study and are beyond the scope of this discussion). As but one example of the 
within-group differences in sexual orientation, endorsement of the label “bisexual” will 
be considered in detail. A total of 55 participants in the study sample (16.6%) selected the 
label bisexual. Of these, three people (0.9%) were genetically male and transgender or 
gender nontraditional. No genetically female transgender (e.g., FTM) individuals 
endorsed this label. Eleven (3.3%) bisexual respondents were non-transgender men, and 
41 bisexual respondents (12.3%) were non-transgender women. These data are more 
precise in that they consider the intersection of sexual orientation and gender identity, but 
it should be noted that they do not describe other within group variations among bisexual 
participants based on, for example, age or race. This reflects standard issues of balancing 
parsimony with specificity in reporting. Thus, participant data for the remaining sexual 
orientation labels is provided solely at the group level. One hundred thirteen participants 
in the study sample (34.0%) were gay, 104 participants (31.3%) were lesbian, 43 
participants (13.0%) identified as queer, seven (2.1%) were questioning/uncertain, and 
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ten individuals (3.0%) listed their sexual orientation as “other.”  
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 74 ( x  = 35.1, sd = 14.1). Almost a third (n = 
100, 30.1%) of the participants were aged 18-24. Proportion of participants decreased 
progressively in ascending age groups: 91 respondents (27.4%) were aged 25-34; 53 
(16.0%) were aged 35-44; 43 (13.0%) were aged 45-54; 33 (9.9%) were aged 55-64; and 
12 (3.6%) were aged 65-74. The majority of participants in the study sample (n = 252, 
78.9%) identified as White/Caucasian, 21 (6.3%) were Latino/a, 15 (4.5%) identified as 
African American/Black, 11 (3.3%) were East or South Asian American, three (.9%) 
identified as American Indian/Native American, 12 (3.6%) were biracial or multiracial, 
and eight (2.4%) described their race/ethnicity as “other” or did not identify their 
race/ethnicity. In terms of educational attainment, five study participants (1.5%) had a 
high school degree/GED, 70 (21.1%) participants had completed some college, 10 (3.0%) 
had completed an associate or technical degree, 54 (16.3%) had a bachelor’s degree, 30 
(9.0%) had completed some graduate or professional schooling, 88 (26.5%) had a 
master’s degree, and 74 (22.3%) had a doctoral degree. 
Just over half of the participants in the study sample (n = 179, 53.9%) lived in 
urban areas, 112 (33.7%) lived in suburban areas, 33 (9.9%) lived in rural areas, and 8 
participants (2.4%) selected “other.” Nearly one-third of the respondents in this sample (n 
= 100, 30.1%) were from the Midwestern United States, 25.6% (n = 85) were from the 
Northeastern states, 24.1% (n = 80), were from the Southeastern U.S., 13.9% (n = 46) 
were from Western states, and 4.8% (n = 16) were from the Southwestern U.S. Four 
participants (1.2%) were from Canadian provinces, and one respondent (0.3%) was from 
Puerto Rico. Study participants reported their socioeconomic or social class status using 
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the modified version of the MacArthur Subjective Status Scale used in the pilot study 
(SSS; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000) on a 10-point scale where “1 = 
lowest” and “10 = highest.” Responses ranged from 1 to 10, with a mean of 6.3 (sd = 
1.6), and a modal response of seven endorsed by 25.6% of the sample. 
Instrumentation  
Demographic questionnaire. All participants were provided a demographic 
questionnaire constructed by the researcher for the purposes of this study. Respondents 
were asked to indicate the sex assigned to them at birth; the gender identity in which they 
presently live; sexual orientation (two means of assessing this were used); age; 
race/ethnicity; state and geographical area (i.e., rural, suburban, urban) of residence; 
highest level of education completed, and socioeconomic status (see Appendix D).  
Personal Need for Structure scale (PNS; Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1989). 
Convergent validity for the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Beliefs Scale (SOBS) 
would be established by comparison with a measure of need for cognitive structure (see 
Appendix E). The PNS is a measure of a person’s dispositional motivation to cognitively 
structure the surrounding world in simple and unambiguous ways. The PNS is a 12-item 
measure loading on two factors: an individual’s need to structure the world in simple 
ways (four items; e.g., “I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more”), 
and that individual’s reactions to a lack of structure (seven items; e.g., “I hate to change 
my plans at the last minute”). The measure utilizes a 6–point scale from “1 = strongly 
disagree” to “5 = strongly disagree.” High scores indicate greater need for simple 
structure. In six initial validation studies conducted by Neuberg and Newsom (1993), the 
authors reported alpha coefficients for the total scale ranging from .76 to .86; for the 
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individual factors, the median alpha value was .77. Test-retest reliability after a 12-week 
period was reported as r = .76 overall, .84 for factor 1, and .79 for factor 2. The PNS has 
been found to be distinct from measures of authoritarianism, dogmatism, intolerance of 
ambiguity, and an uncertainty orientation (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Furthermore, 
there is evidence that scores on the PNS are not influenced by social desirability. In the 
present study, an internal reliability coefficient of .85 was obtained for the total scale. 
The alpha values for both factor 1 (Desire for Structure) and factor 2 (Response to Lack 
of Structure) in the present sample were .78. 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 2006). Discriminant 
validity for the SOBS scale would be explored by comparison with a measure of right-
wing authoritarianism (see Appendix E). Right-wing authoritarianism was measured by 
Altemeyer’s RWA scale. This version of the RWA is a recent modification of a scale 
originally devised by Altemeyer in 1973 and periodically revised. In the thirty years since 
its debut, the RWA scale has been translated into languages other than English (e.g., 
Swedish), modified, updated, and shortened. Recently, Altemeyer (2006) authored a book 
about authoritarianism written for a general audience and made the full text available. 
The version of the RWA that appears in that text was selected for this study because it 
represents a recent revision written in accessible language for an English-speaking 
audience. 
The version of the RWA used in the present study is comprised of 20 items, 
which are rated from “-4 = very strongly disagree” to “4 = very strongly agree.” The 
scale is a unidimensional measure of three attitude clusters: authoritarian submission, 
authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Higher scores indicate higher levels of 
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authoritarianism. A recent review of 16 studies that employed this version of the RWA 
reported alpha ranges from a low of .73 to a high of .93 (Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson, 
2006). A sample item from this scale is “obedience is the most important virtue children 
should learn.” The Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale has been demonstrated to 
adequately differentiate from a social dominance orientation and religious 
fundamentalism (Altemeyer, 2006; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). The internal 
reliability coefficient for the RWA obtained in this study sample was .88. 
Collective Self Esteem Scale (CSES; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Predictive 
validity for the SOBS scale would be established using a measure of collective self-
esteem (see Appendix E). The 16-item CSES is comprised of four subscales of four items 
each. The Private Collective Self-Esteem subscale assesses the extent to which 
individuals feel positively about their social groups; for example, “I am a worthy member 
of the group I belong to.” The Public Collective Self-Esteem subscale measures the 
degree to which individuals believe that others feel positively about their social groups, 
as exemplified by the item, “I feel good about the social groups I belong to.” The 
Membership Collective Self-Esteem subscale assesses the extent to which individuals 
believe that they are good members of their social groups (e.g., “I am a cooperative 
participant in the social groups I belong to”), and the Importance to Identity Collective 
Self-Esteem subscale measures the degree to which individuals believe their social 
groups are an important part of their self-concept (e.g., “The social groups I belong to are 
an important reflection of who I am”). Factor loadings in a large validation study ranged 
from .54 to .83, and the four-factor solution accounted for 60.7% of the variance. 
Responses are provided on a scale from “1 = strongly disagree” to “7 = strongly agree,” 
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with higher scores indicating higher collective self-esteem. The CSES has been found to 
have good internal consistency, with alpha coefficients for the total scale ranging from 
.83 to .88 in the validation studies. Validity for this measure was established through 
positive correlations with personal self-esteem (typically found to range from r = .20 to 
.40; Utsey & Constantine, 2006) and collectivism. Additionally, 6-week test-retest 
reliability for the CSES has been reported as .68 for the total scale (Liang & Fassinger, 
2008). In the present study, internal reliability of the total scale was .84. Alpha values for 
the individual factors were .82 for Membership CSE, .81 for Private CSE, .78 for Public 
CSE, and .81 for Importance to Identity. 
Procedures 
 Participants were recruited for this project through distribution of e-mail 
announcements over a four-week period in the spring of 2008. Announcement of the 
study was made via email to the listserv of Division 44 of the American Psychological 
Association (Society for the Psychological Study of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Issues); 
LGBT student groups at colleges and universities; a variety of community organizations 
and educational groups for sexual minority people; sexual minority faith-based groups 
(e.g., Metropolitan Community Church, Dignity); LGBT advocacy groups; and other 
relevant listservs and websites. In selecting electronic venues for announcement of the 
study, specific efforts were made to recruit participants for the study who were diverse in 
age, disability status, racial/ethnic identity, educational attainment, and religion. 
Additionally, recruitment e-mails were sent to personal and professional contacts of the 
principal investigator (see Appendix F). In the solicitation emails, prospective 
participants were informed that the study had been approved by the Institutional Research 
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Board (IRB) at The University of Maryland, College Park and were provided contact 
information for questions regarding the study. Furthermore, in each of these 
announcements, recipients were encouraged to forward along the survey web address to 
other individuals or organizations known to them. Multiple methods such as these have 
been recommended to reduce bias associated with reliance upon a single recruitment 
strategy, including in research with sexual minorities (Konik & Stewart, 2004). However, 
the snowball recruitment approach also renders it impossible to calculate a response rate 
for this study. 
 The survey was administered on the Internet via a secured web site meeting 
suggested guidelines for accessibility for people with disabilities 
(www.surveymonkey.com). On-line research has become an important tool in gathering 
high-quality psychological data in recent years, and it provides greater anonymity than 
traditional paper-and-pencil methods, which may be especially important in conducting 
research with sexual minority individuals who may not be out in all areas of their lives 
(Barak & English, 2002). One limitation of Internet based research is that participants can 
submit completed surveys more than once. Additionally, web-based research is 
susceptible to malicious reporting by individuals seeking to undermine the research 
project, an issue of specific concern in LGBT-related research. As an attempt to partially 
offset these concerns, a conservative approach to data screening (i.e., elimination of data 
suggestive of deceit) was prepared, as has been used in previous research (e.g., 
Worthington, Dillon, & Becker-Shutte, 2005). Because surveys may be identified by 
date, time, and Internet protocol (IP) address, these were carefully reviewed to be sure 
that no duplicate surveys (i.e., identical response sets from the same IP address) appeared 
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to be submitted accidentally. No such identical response sets or repeat IP addresses were 
found in the data. Additionally, periodic internet searches were conducted to track the 
“travel” of the survey announcement. The request for participants was located on several 
LGB-related websites or weblogs, but not on any sites or blogs that would be suggestive 
of widespread contamination of data. 
In the recruitment announcement, potential participants were asked to complete 
an online survey about their beliefs about sexual orientation. The web address of the 
survey was provided in the recruitment e-mail. Upon accessing the website, participants 
were provided an electronic informed consent form detailing eligibility requirements, 
basic information about the purpose of the study, a statement of confidentiality, potential 
risks and benefits to participants, and contact information for the researchers and the 
University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (see Appendix G). Participants had 
the option of printing a copy of the informed consent form. Individuals who indicated 
consent were directed to the survey, which was estimated to take approximately 20-30 
minutes to complete. Participants first completed the Demographic Questionnaire. Next, 
participants completed the SOBS, followed by the PNS, the CSES, and lastly, the RWA. 
After completing the survey, participants were given space to provide feedback on the 
study and were offered the opportunity to enter an email address if they were interested in 
participating in the lottery drawing for one of five $20 gift cards. Finally, participants 
were directed to the debriefing page, which could be printed and retained (see Appendix 
H). Any individual who did not indicate consent to the study was directed immediately to 
the debriefing page. Of the original 804 individuals who accessed the survey, 34.6% (n = 
238) provided feedback via the survey itself, and an additional 33 people have contacted 
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this investigator privately to request additional information or a summary of the study 
results. Slightly more than half of the total number of participants (56.1%) asked to be 




This chapter presents the results of statistical analyses conducted in the present 
study. First, the initial exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the initial Sexual Orientation 
Beliefs Scale (SOBS) produced through the item generation and vetting process 
described in the preceding chapter is presented. Use of this initial EFA for item deletion 
to further hone the SOBS is discussed and results of a subsequent EFA are provided. 
Additionally, assessment of the validity of the SOBS utilizing measures of 
authoritarianism, need for cognitive structure, and collective self-esteem is described. 
Finally, results of several exploratory research questions are reported.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Hypothesis 1: A Sexual Orientation Beliefs Scale (SOBS) can be created that will 
produce adequate estimates of internal consistency reliability as measured by Cronbach’s 
alpha at the levels of the individual subscales. 
Hypothesis 2: The SOBS will be a unified but multidimensional measure 
comprised of essentialist, social constructionist, and agentic beliefs about sexual 
orientation.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 jointly addressed the reliability and factor structure of the 
SOBS. In order to test these hypotheses, exploratory factor analysis was conducted. Best 
practice recommendations regarding the use of factor analysis in counseling psychology 
research were reviewed and employed with respect to factor extraction, factor retention, 
approximation of simple structure, and meaningful interpretation of the factors (e.g., 
Kahn, 2006; Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006).  
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Preliminary Analyses 
Before testing the appropriateness of factor analysis with the 71-item SOBS, 
missing values were analyzed for each item. Less than 1% of cases were missing data for 
any one item; that is, no more than 4 out of 332 participants failed to respond to any 
single item. As there was no apparent pattern to the missing data, it was determined that 
pairwise analyses would be utilized. Subsequently, the factorability of the data set was 
evaluated using Bartlett’s (1950) test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
test of sampling adequacy. Bartlett’s test was used to determine whether the data 
constituted a representative sample of the normal population. A significant chi-square test 
indicates that the correlations in the correlation matrix are different from zero and 
provides support for the appropriateness of factor analysis (Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987). 
Results of this test were significant, χ2 (df 4485, N = 332) = 8734.43, p < .001, suggesting 
that the data were appropriate to submit to factor analysis. The KMO test of sampling 
adequacy estimates the likelihood that the correlation matrix actually contains factors 
rather than chance correlations. A KMO score above .60 is generally required for factor 
analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The KMO 
statistic in the present study was .85, further providing support for the factorability of the 
data set. Thus, an initial EFA was conducted. 
Initial EFA 
Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) was selected as the method of factor extraction, 
and a Promax rotation of extracted factors was utilized. PAF and principal components 
analysis (PCA) represent two of the most frequently utilized factor extraction methods; 
however, PCA is better understood as a data reduction strategy and is not a factor analytic 
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strategy per se (Kahn, 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Worthington & Whittaker, 
2006). True factor analytic techniques have been described both as more appropriate to 
the goals of scale development, where the goal is to understand the interrelationships 
among measured variables in terms of a smaller number of latent constructs (Kahn). 
Additionally, factor analysis is more likely than PCA to produce results that are 
generalizable to a confirmatory factor analysis, which frequently is a next step in the 
scale development and refinement process (Worthington & Whittaker). Thus, an actual 
factor analytic strategy was preferred and PAF was selected as the factor extraction 
method for the current project. A rotation of extracted factors was deemed desirable 
because rotated solutions tend to increase the interpretability of factors without 
fundamentally altering the mathematical solution obtained during factor extraction 
(Kahn, 2006). Factor rotations are of two types: orthogonal and oblique. Orthogonal 
rotations (e.g., Varimax) assume uncorrelated factors while oblique rotations (e.g., 
Promax) allow for factors to be intercorrelated. It is reasonable to expect that beliefs 
about sexual orientation may be intercorrelated and are therefore appropriate to an 
oblique rotation; furthermore, it is considered a best practice to conduct an oblique 
rotation when lacking empirical evidence that factors are independent of one another 
(Worthington & Whittaker). A Promax rotation “starts with an orthogonal rotation and 
then finesses the solution with an oblique rotation” (Kahn, 2006, p. 697) so that if the 
factors were in fact to be uncorrelated, the rotation would remain orthogonal. Thus a 
Promax rotation was deemed to be an optimal choice for the current study.   
The initial PAF with Promax rotation was conducted. Initial communality 
estimates based on squared multiple correlations for SOBS items ranged from ĥ = .30 to 
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ĥ =.74, ( x  = .47). These communalities are within the appropriate range for factor 
analysis (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006) and can be found in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Initial Communality Estimates for 71-item SOBS 
 
People who have the same sexual orientation are very similar to one another.  .436 
Sexual orientation is innate.  .661 
In all cultures there are people who are attracted to members of the same sex.  .409 
Terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," and "heterosexual" mean different things 
to different people. 
 .390 
Individuals choose their sexual orientation.  .529 
People can experience either privilege or discrimination based on their sexual 
orientation. 
 .310 
Most people are probably naturally bisexual.  .345 
If people weren't interested in discussing sexual orientation, it wouldn't exist.  .397 
Sexual orientation is a category with clear boundaries: A person is either 
heterosexual or not. 
 .586 
Sexual orientation is set early on in life.  .506 
Knowing a person’s sexual orientation tells you a lot about them.  .467 
People may reasonably identify as two sexual orientations at the same time.  .478 
Family influence is the main basis of an individual’s sexual orientation.  .419 
Sexual orientation is an important characteristic of people.  .612 
We know what it means when a person tells us his or her sexual orientation.  .449 
People with different sexual orientations have different goals in life.  .368 
Queer is a sexual orientation that is different from lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
heterosexual. 
 .331 




There are more similarities than differences among people who have the same 
sexual orientation. 
 .429 
Sexual orientation is caused by biological factors such as genes or hormones.  .679 
People with different sexual orientations probably have existed throughout 
history. 
 .315 
If you don’t know a person’s sexual orientation, you can’t really say that you 
know that person. 
 .354 
A person's sexual orientation can change over time.  .663 
Most people view their sexual orientation as important to them.  .411 
People may have different sexual orientations in different contexts.  .548 
The term "sexual orientation" is easy to define.  .415 
People select the sexual orientation that best fits the life they want to live.  .488 
The idea that individuals possess a sexual orientation is not based in reality.  .525 
People have access to different amounts of social power depending upon their 
sexual orientation. 
 .337 
Sexual orientation is a category with clear boundaries: A person is either 
gay/lesbian, bisexual, or heterosexual. 
 .688 
Sexual orientation cannot be changed by treatments and therapies.  .332 
People who have the same sexual orientation interact frequently with one 
another. 
 .368 
Biology is the main basis of an individual’s sexual orientation.  .743 
People with the same sexual orientation share a necessary or defining 
characteristic, without which they would not belong to that group. 
 .417 
People with the same sexual orientation share a common fate.  .381 
People tend to have a sense of group belonging based on their sexual orientation.  .443 
People with different sexual orientations are fundamentally different.  .447 
There is a “gay gene.”   .478 
The percentages of people in different sexual orientation groups are roughly the 
same all over the world. 
 .427 
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Your sexual orientation can change depending on who you are with or where 
you are. 
 .601 
It is possible to know about many aspects of a person once you know her or his 
sexual orientation. 
 .428 
Personal preference is the main basis of an individual’s sexual orientation.  .400 
The idea that individuals have a "sexual orientation" is a social invention.  .547 
Sexual orientation is a category with distinct boundaries: A person is either 
gay/lesbian or heterosexual. 
 .664 
People probably choose sexual orientation labels for themselves in part based on 
how that group is viewed by others. 
 .342 
An individual's sexual orientation does not change.  .717 
A person's sexual orientation is an important attribute.  .589 
Sexual orientation does not exist outside of a person's relationship(s).  .376 
People who share the same sexual orientation pursue common goals.  .420 
Difficult or traumatic experiences have no effect on sexual orientation.  .396 
Individuals with the same sexual orientation seem to be connected to one another 
by some invisible link. 
 .485 
Same-sex relationships are fundamentally different from heterosexual 
relationships. 
 .413 
A person has only one true sexual orientation.  .687 
It's useful to group people according to their sexual orientation.  .468 
Although people with the same sexual orientation have some differences on the 
surface, underneath they are basically the same. 
 .357 
The existence of different sexual orientations is natural.  .454 
Using terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," and "heterosexual" only reinforces 
stereotypes. 
 .487 
People have control over changing or keeping their sexual orientation.  .577 
It is possible to be “partially” or “somewhat” gay or straight.  .450 
People with different sexual orientations are destined to have different life paths.  .443 
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People who identify as bisexual are confused about their true sexual orientation.  .569 
All people have a sexual orientation.  .414 
A person may claim a given sexual orientation for political reasons.  .297 
Groupings like "gay" and "straight" are pretty artificial.  .479 
It is impossible to truly change one’s sexual orientation.  .507 
Social and environmental factors are the main basis of an individual’s sexual 
orientation. 
 .502 
People with different sexual orientations do not tend to interact with one another.  .336 
If someone comes out as gay or lesbian they were probably attracted to the same 
sex all along. 
 .556 
Something deep inside of a person determines her or his sexual orientation.  .518 
A person's sexual orientation is revealed by their sexual relationships.  .425 





The use of multiple criteria is recommended in determining the number of factors 
to extract during EFA (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Kahn, 2006; Worthington & 
Whittaker, 2006), and this recommendation was followed in the current study. Cattell’s 
scree test involves examining the scree plot, a graphical representation of eigenvalues 
(i.e., the amount of variance accounted for) by number of factors, to determine the 
location at which the graph “flattens out” (Kahn, 2006). Factors above the point where 
the scree line flattens out should be retained. Unfortunately, the scree test is highly 
subjective and depending on the data involved a specific “break” or “elbow” in the line 
may be difficult to identify. In such a case, the scree test may provide a suggestion as to 
several possible solutions that must be considered in greater detail. In the present study, 
the scree test appears to suggest an optimal solution of four or five factors (see Figure 1). 
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It should be noted that Kaiser’s criterion (i.e., retaining all factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one), was not utilized in the present study. Kahn notes that it is statistically 
incorrect to apply this criterion with any factor extraction method other than PCA, and 
further typically results in retention of too many factors. 
The overarching goal in determining number of factors to retain is to approximate 
simple structure (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). A factor pattern has approximated 
simple structure if the individual items load strongly on only one factor, and have small 
correlations (or cross-loadings) with other factors in the structure. Thus, another means of 
assessing the best number of factors to retain in addition to the scree test is to consider 
item loadings and cross-loadings provided in the individual pattern matrices for each 
possible solution. For example, factors should contain items which load at least at the .32 
level, and cross-loadings of greater than .15 are typically to be avoided (Costello & 
Osborne, 2005). Furthermore, factors comprised of fewer than three items typically are 
not retained, as these are considered poorly defined and are unlikely to hold up in future 
analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Nevertheless, deletion of such factors, if comprised 
of items that are highly intercorrelated and relatively uncorrelated with other variables, 
may result in the loss of important information (Worthington & Whittaker). Finally, a 
factor solution is only useful to the extent that it has explanatory power, and so the 
interpretability of each potential factor solution must be considered as well. Ultimately, it 
is often suggested that researchers explore solutions with at least one more and one less 
factor than they initially believe to be optimal based on the scree test (Tinsley & Tinsley, 
1987). Thus, for the purposes of the present study, two, three, four, five and six-factor 
solutions for the SOBS were examined for approximate simple structure and for 
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interpretability. 
In order to assess the relative merit and utility of the factor solutions, pattern 
coefficients for each solution were examined. The six factor structure solution was ruled 
out due to few items loading on several of the factors, moderate factor loadings, and a 
lack of clear interpretability. The five factor solution provided better overall factor 
loadings but the fifth factor had moderate factor loadings and was limited to five items 
that collectively were difficult to interpret. The three and two factor solutions had an 
increased number of crossloadings and seemed to be overly reductive according to the 



















Figure 1. Scree Plot for Initial EFA 
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The four factor solution had the best overall statistical properties: reasonable 
factor loadings, adequate items per factor, and few crossloadings. Twenty-two items 
loaded on factor 1 above the minimum suggested .3, and ten of these loaded above .5. 
Fifteen items loaded on factor 2 above .3, with nine loading above .5. On factor 3, 16 
items loaded above .3, of which 2 loaded above .5, and on factor 4, nine items loaded 
above .3 with three of these loading above .5. Furthermore, the four factor solution had 
the initial appearance of interpretability. While pattern coefficients indicate the 
relationship between a variables and a factor controlling for the other factors, structure 
coefficients do not control for the other factors and have been suggested as more useful in 
the naming of factors (Kahn, 2006). Thus, structure coefficients were examined to assess 
the potential interpretability of the four factor structure. Tentative factor labels were 
noted at this time: naturalness, discreteness, entitativity, and personal and social 
importance. These labels were considered tentative, because a secondary objective of the 
initial EFA was to utilize the data to optimize the length of the SOBS through deletion of 
items, a common goal in scale development (Kahn). It was hoped that the SOBS could be 
reduced in length significantly from the original 71 items tested to increase the likelihood 
and ease of future use. 
Final EFA 
Drawing again from recommendations in the literature, items were considered for 
deletion from the SOBS which had less than the minimum rotated factor loading of .30 
(Kahn, 2006) and cross-loaded at or below .15 (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The 
scale was modified through an iterative process of deleting the weakest items in the 
solution and then conducting a new factor analysis with the remaining items and 
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assessing items based on the new solution (Kahn, 2006). Additionally, internal 
consistency reliability of each factor was assessed using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha and 
this provided additional useful information when evaluating items for deletion. 
Through this process, the prospective SOBS scale containing 71 items was 
reduced to a 35-item measure reflecting four factors. This four factor model accounted 
for a total of 35.33% of the variance in SOBS scores. The Pearson product-moment 
correlation matrix for the obtained four-factor solution appears in Table 3. Results reveal 
small or nonsignificant correlations between most of the factors of the SOBS. However, 
medium correlations were found between the Naturalness and Discreteness factors of the 
SOBS (r = .38, p < .001), and also between the Discreteness and Entitativity factors (r = 
.33, p < .001). The pattern matrix produced in the final EFA for the 35-item SOBS can be 
found in Table 4. This pattern matrix reflects the factor loadings for each item, 
controlling for the other factors in the solution. 
Table 3 
Intercorrelations Among SOBS Factors 
 
 
Factor Naturalness Discreteness Entitativity Importance 
1 1.000    
2 .38** 1.000   
3 .23** .33** 1.000  
4 .11 .13* .23** 1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the .001 level. 





Structure Coefficients for the 35-item SOBS 
 
 
Naturalness Discreteness Entitativity Importance 
Biology is the main basis of an individual’s 
sexual orientation. 
.775    
Sexual orientation is innate. .753    
Individuals choose their sexual orientation. -.652    
Social and environmental factors are the main 
basis of an individual’s sexual 
orientation. 
-.638    
People have control over changing or keeping 
their sexual orientation. 
-.638    
Something deep inside of a person determines 
her or his sexual orientation. 
.637    
The existence of different sexual orientations 
is natural. 
.562    
If someone comes out as gay or lesbian they 
were probably attracted to the same sex 
all along. 
.526    
The percentages of people in different sexual 
orientation groups are roughly the same 
all over the world. 
.514    
It is impossible to truly change one’s sexual 
orientation. 
.511    
The idea that individuals have a "sexual 
orientation" is a social invention. 
-.491    
Sexual orientation is set early on in life. .454    
Sexual orientation is a category with distinct 
boundaries: A person is either 
gay/lesbian or heterosexual. 
 .788   
Sexual orientation is a category with clear 
boundaries: A person is either 
gay/lesbian, bisexual, or heterosexual. 
 .752   
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People who identify as bisexual are confused 
about their true sexual orientation. 
 .646   
A person has only one true sexual orientation.  .606   
It is possible to be “partially” or “somewhat” 
gay or straight. 
 -.536   
People may reasonably identify as two sexual 
orientations at the same time. 
 -.466   
Individuals with the same sexual orientation 
seem to be connected to one another by 
some invisible link. 
  .635  
People who have the same sexual orientation 
are very similar to one another. 
  .571  
There are more similarities than differences 
among people who have the same sexual 
orientation. 
  .552  
It is possible to know about many aspects of a 
person once you know her or his sexual 
orientation. 
  .528  
It is usually possible to know a person's 
sexual orientation even without being 
told. 
  .446  
People tend to have a sense of group 
belonging based on their sexual 
orientation. 
  .445  
People who share the same sexual orientation 
pursue common goals. 
  .426  
Knowing a person’s sexual orientation tells 
you a lot about them. 
  .425  
People who have the same sexual orientation 
interact frequently with one another. 
  .421  
People with the same sexual orientation share 
a common fate. 
  .364  
Sexual orientation is an important 
characteristic of people. 
   .809 
     
81 
A person's sexual orientation is an important 
attribute. 
.719 
Using terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," 
and "heterosexual" only reinforces 
stereotypes. 
   -.486 
If you don’t know a person’s sexual 
orientation, you can’t really say that you 
know that person. 
   .374 
Most people view their sexual orientation as 
important to them. 
   .337 
It's useful to group people according to their 
sexual orientation. 
   .315 
People have access to different amounts of 
social power depending upon their sexual 
orientation. 
   .310 
Note: Coefficients less than .30 are suppressed in this table. 
 
Factor 1: Naturalness. Factor 1 of the four-factor solution described above 
consisted of 12 items. These items reflect four basic themes: a belief that sexual 
orientation is innate and biologically based (e.g., “Biology is the main basis of an 
individual’s sexual orientation”), that sexual orientation is characterized by early fixity 
(e.g., “If someone comes out as gay or lesbian they were probably attracted to the same 
sex all along”), that sexual orientation is immutable (e.g., “It is impossible to truly change 
one’s sexual orientation”), and that sexual orientation is a characteristic that is stable 
across cultures (e.g., “The percentages of people in different sexual orientation groups are 
roughly the same all over the world”). Eight of these items were generated explicitly to 
represent essentialist sub-themes as defined in prior empirical work, such as naturalness 
and immutability, and all had positive factor loadings. Notably, two of these items were 
designed to reflect social constructionist concepts (i.e., unrealness and contextuality), 
such as the item, “The idea that individuals have a ‘sexual orientation’ is a social 
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invention.” These loaded negatively on the factor. The two final items reflected agency-
related beliefs (e.g., “Individuals choose their sexual orientation”) and these also loaded 
negatively on this factor. Factor 1 was labeled Naturalness in order to reflect the 
collection of beliefs that define sexual orientation as organic and unchanging and not 
chosen or socially constructed. Factor loadings ranged from .45 to .78. Obtained scores 
on factor 1 ranged from 20 to 60, out of a possible range of 12 to 60. The mean score was 
44.73 (sd = 7.87). The internal consistency reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) for 
the Naturalness factor the SOBS was .87. This factor accounted for 17.22% of the total 
variance. 
Factor 2: Discreteness. The second factor in the four-factor solution contained six 
items. These items reflect beliefs that sexual orientation is characterized by clear 
boundaries between category groupings (e.g., Sexual orientation is a category with 
distinct boundaries: A person is either gay/lesbian or heterosexual”), and that an 
individual may only claim membership in one category grouping (e.g., “A person has 
only one true sexual orientation”). Four of the items that loaded on factor 2 were intended 
to reflect the essentialist constructs of discreteness and exclusivity, two were written to 
address the social constructionist factor of fluidity (e.g., “It is possible to be ‘partially’ or 
‘somewhat’ gay or straight”). These latter two items loaded negatively on the identified 
factor. Loadings on the Discreteness factor ranged from .47 to .79. Scores in the study 
sample for factor 2 ranged from 6 to 28 out of a possible range of 6 to 30 for this factor. 
The mean score for factor 2 was 12.49 (sd = 4.08), and the internal reliability was .75. 
This factor accounted for 8.20% of the total variance. 
Factor 3: Entitativity. The third factor produced in this EFA was comprised of ten 
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items. General themes encompassed by these items include belief in an 
interconnectedness among sexual orientation group members (e.g., “Individuals with the 
same sexual orientation seem to be connected to one another by some invisible link”), 
uniformity of category members (e.g., “There are more similarities than differences 
among people who have the same sexual orientation”), and informativeness of the 
category (e.g., “Knowing a person’s sexual orientation tells you a lot about them”). All of 
the ten items loading on this factor were generated to reflect essentialist themes 
previously outlined in the literature, such as groupness and informativeness. No social 
constructionist or agentic items loaded on this factor. The Entitativity factor revealed 
factor loadings of .36 to .63. Factor 3 scores ranged from 11 to 39 out of a possible range 
of 10 to 50 for this factor. The mean score in the current sample was 24.72 (sd = 4.82), 
and the internal reliability coefficient was .81. This factor accounted for 6.02% of the 
total variance in scores. 
Factor 4: Personal and social importance. The fourth factor in the four-factor 
solution produced by principal axis factoring contained seven items. The items in this 
factor address the relative importance of sexual orientation, either intrapersonally (e.g., 
“A person's sexual orientation is an important attribute”) or interpersonally (e.g., “If you 
don’t know a person’s sexual orientation, you can’t really say that you know that 
person”). Attention to social importance is also represented in this factor, such as in the 
item, “Using terms like ‘lesbian,’ ‘gay,’ ‘bisexual,’ and ‘heterosexual’ only reinforces 
stereotypes.” Five of the items loading on this factor were intended to reflect the 
essentialist themes of importance and informativeness. Two items were intended to 
reflect social constructionist themes addressing the importance of context and power. One 
84 
item (the item intended to address contextuality) loaded negatively on the factor. 
Loadings on the Personal and Social Importance factor (hereafter referred to more simply 
as the Importance factor) ranged from .31 to .81. Factor 4 scores ranged from 11 to 32 out 
of a possible range of 7 to 35. The mean score of this factor was 23.62 (sd = 3.79), and 
the internal reliability was .67. This factor accounted for 3.89% of the total variance. 
Summary 
Results of the exploratory factor analysis provided support for Hypothesis 1, 
which posited that a Sexual Orientation Beliefs Scale (SOBS) with adequate estimates of 
internal consistency reliability at the level of the individual subscales could be created. 
Hypothesis 2 suggested that the SOBS would be a unified but multidimensional measure 
of beliefs of sexual orientation. Exploratory factor analysis suggested that a four-factor 
solution optimally characterized the structure of the SOBS. The four discrete, 
intercorrelated factors obtained through EFA provided support for Hypothesis 2.  
Research Questions 
Research Question 1 explored the relationship between sexual orientation beliefs 
and right-wing authoritarianism. Relationships between scores on the subscales of the 
SOBS and scores on the Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale were examined using 
Pearson product-moment correlations (see Appendix M). Significant correlations were 
not obtained between the RWA and the Naturalness factor (Factor 1; r = -.06) or the 
Entitativity factor (Factor 3; r = .08) of the SOBS. There was a significant, positive 
correlation between scores on the RWA and scores on the Discreteness scale (Factor 2) of 
the SOBS (r = .28, p <.01). There was a significant, negative relationship between RWA 
and Importance (Factor 4) scores (r = -.18, p < .01). The significant relationships found 
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were less than .30, reflective of a small relationship between the RWA and these SOBS 
subscales (Cohen, 1988). Thus, overall, low to moderate relationships were found 
between the four factors of the SOBS and the RWA.  
Research Question 2 sought to explore the relationship between sexual orientation 
beliefs and the need for cognitive structure. Correlations between the Personal Need for 
Structure scale (PNS) and extracted factors of the SOBS were conducted and examined 
(Appendix M). Three correlations were significant at the .05 level: between the total PNS 
and the Importance factor (r = .12), between the Desire for Structure factor of the PNS 
and the Importance factor of the SOBS (r = .13), and between the Response to Lack of 
Structure factor of the PNS and the Entitativity factor of the SOBS (r = .11). These 
relationships were positive but small. Thus, little to no relationship was found between 
the sexual orientation beliefs as measured by the SOBS and a need for cognitive structure 
as measured by the PNS.  
Research Question 3 explored the relationship between sexual orientation beliefs 
and collective self esteem. This relationship was investigated by examining correlations 
between the SOBS subscales and the Collective Self Esteem Scale (CSES).  
The total scale scores for the CSES failed to correlate significantly (r = .05) with 
the Naturalness factor (see Appendix M). A significant, positive correlation was obtained 
between total CSES scores and the Entitativity factor (r = .12, p < .05); however, this 
relationship was quite small. Furthermore, a moderate, positive relationship (r = .32, p < 
.01) between the total CSES score and the Importance factor was found. When the 
relationships between SOBS subscales and CSES subscales were examined, several 
additional significant relationships were revealed. Specifically, these were between the 
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CSES Membership subscale and the SOBS Naturalness (r = .14, p < .05) and Importance 
(r = .25, p < .01) factors; between the CSES Private scale and the SOBS Importance 
subscale (r= .19, p < .01); between the CSES Public scale and the SOBS Entitativity (r= 
.14, p < .05) and Importance (r= -.11, p < .05) scales; and between the CSES Identity 
subscale and the SOBS Entitativity (r= .12, p < .05) and Importance (r= .49, p < .01) 
subscales. Notably, only the latter is a reasonably strong correlation. Thus, collective self 
esteem was found to be most strongly related to the beliefs about the personal and social 
importance of sexual orientation. 
 The fourth and final research question sought to investigate the relationship 
between demographic variables of participants and scores on the SOBS. Results of 
analyses related to this research question are presented below. 
 Potential gender differences in SOBS subscale scores were explored. For the 
purposes of this analysis, transgender-identified individuals were omitted from the 
sample. Independent samples t-tests were conducted. Scores for women and men differed 
significantly on each of the SOBS subscales (see Table 5). For all factors, women’s mean 
scores were significantly lower than men’s. The effect sizes of the differences ranged 
from .02 to .13. The effect sizes for the Discreteness, Entitativity, and Importance factors 
were small; only the Naturalness factor difference demonstrated a medium effect size. 
The relationships between sexual orientation self-labeling and scores on the 
SOBS were also explored. Individuals who self-labeled as “questioning/uncertain” or 
“other” were excluded from this analysis. A one-way between-groups analysis of 
variance was conducted. There were statistically significant differences found for three of 
the four subscales; only the Importance factor did not reveal statistically significant 
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Table 5 
















-6.57 293 .000 -5.45 .13 
Discreteness 
 
-3.61 301 .000 -1.69 .04 
Entitativity 
 
-2.72 296 .007 -1.54 .02 
Importance 
 
-3.52 299 .000 -1.57 .04 
 
 
differences. Statistically significant differences at the p < .05 level were found between 
individuals who self identified as gay ( x  = 25.5, sd = 5.1) and those who self identified as 
queer ( x  = 23.0, sd = 4.1) on the Entitativity factor of the SOBS [F (3, 303) = 3.01, p = 
.03]. Despite reaching statistical significance, however, the actual difference in mean 
scores on this factor was small, as indicated by the calculated effect size (η2 = .03). 
Significant differences were also found between sexual orientation groups on both the 
Naturalness [F (3, 300) = 34.52, p < .001] and Discreteness [F (3, 308) = 32.34, p < .001] 
factors. Effect sizes for these differences were calculated (Naturalness η2 = .26, 
Discreteness η2 = .24) and found to be large (Cohen, 1988). Means and standard 
deviations for each group on these two factors appear in Table 6. On the Naturalness 
factor, gay participants had significantly higher mean scores than bisexual, lesbian, or 
queer participants (p < .001); lesbian participants had significantly higher scores than 
queer participants (p < .001); and bisexual participants had significantly higher scores 
than queer participants (p = .016). On the Discreteness factor, gay respondents had 
significantly higher mean scores than bisexual or queer respondents (p < .001) and 
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lesbian respondents had significantly higher scores than bisexual or queer respondents (p 
< .001).  
Table 6 
Scores on Naturalness and Discreteness Subscales by Sexual Orientation Group 
    Naturalness    Discreteness 
  n Mean SD n Mean SD 
Bisexual  51  41.69 7.57 55 10.27 2.11 
 
Gay  112 49.09 6.03 111 14.32 4.31 
  
Lesbian  99  44.75 6.60 103 13.55 3.87 
 
Queer  42  37.43 8.32 43 9.09 1.90 
 
Total  304 44.82 7.89 312 12.63 4.10 
 
 
Pearson product moment correlations were also conducted between scores on the 
SOBS subscales and age. Age was significantly correlated with scores on three of the 
four factors of the SOBS (Naturalness, Discreteness, and Importance). Each of these 
correlations was less than .30, which is indicative of a small relationship (Cohen, 1988). 
Intercorrelations between the SOBS subscales and self-reported SES were also examined; 
only the Importance factor was found to significantly correlate (r = .11, p < .05), albeit 
with a very small value. Table 7 provides the alpha values for age and SES as related to 





Correlation Matrix: SOBS Subscales, Age, and SES 
 









Age r .21** .21** .006 .21** 
  n 321 329 323 327 
      
SES r .07 .07 -.03 .11* 
  n 321 329 323 327 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The relationships between highest level of education and scores on the SOBS 
subscales were assessed through a one-way analysis of variance. For the purposes of this 
analysis, educational attainment was recoded into four groups: high school or some 
college; undergraduate degree (associate’s or bachelor’s); some graduate school or 
master’s degree; and doctoral degree. Statistically significant between-group differences 
were found only on the Importance factor of the SOBS [F (3, 322) = 16.90, p < .001]. 
The effect size was calculated and found to be large (η2 = .14). Examination of mean 
differences revealed progressively higher means on this factor with increasing level of 
education, and differences that were statistically significant between each tier and its 
adjacent tier(s).   
 The potential relationships between geographic area of residence (i.e., suburban, 
urban, rural) and scores on the factors of the SOBS were examined utilizing a one-way 
analysis of variance. No significant differences in SOBS scores were revealed among 




The purpose of the present study was to create a measure of sexual orientation 
beliefs that would build upon an existing literature of essentialist beliefs about social 
groups, integrate key constructs from a social constructionist literature, and incorporate 
agentic themes. In this chapter, results for each of the hypotheses and exploratory 
research questions are discussed. Subsequently, the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
the present investigation are outlined. Finally, potential implications of this study for 
future research, practice, and advocacy are addressed. 
Dimensional Structure of the SOBS 
Hypothesis 1: A Sexual Orientation Beliefs Scale (SOBS) can be created that will 
produce adequate estimates of internal consistency reliability as measured by Cronbach’s 
alpha at the levels of the individual subscales. 
Hypothesis 2: The SOBS will be a unified but multidimensional measure 
comprised of essentialist, social constructionist, and agentic beliefs about sexual 
orientation.  
The dimensional structure of the SOBS was evaluated according to the 
recommendations of experts in factor analysis in counseling psychology research (e.g., 
Kahn, 2006; Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Based on 
comparisons of the item loadings and relative interpretability of several competing 
multidimensional models for this measure, a four-dimensional structure was found to 
provide the best fit for the data. Based on review of the individual items and the structure 
matrix generated through exploratory factor analysis using Principal Axis Factoring with 
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Promax rotation, the obtained factors were named Naturalness, Discreteness, Entitativity, 
and Personal and Social Importance. These individual factors were characterized by good 
internal consistency reliability (with alpha values ranging from .67 to .87), providing 
support for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 was also supported, because the named factors 
reflected discrete but intercorrelated beliefs about sexual orientation. The vast majority of 
retained items on the 35-item SOBS reflected essentialist constructs; however, items 
generated to be reflective of other “types” of sexual orientation beliefs (i.e., social 
constructionist and agentic) were found to load along with essentialist items on certain 
factors.  
Naturalness 
The first factor of the SOBS, Naturalness, encompassed beliefs that sexual 
orientation is innate and biologically based, determined and fixed early in life, unable to 
be changed or chosen, and historically and culturally universal. The Naturalness subscale 
of the SOBS is similar to the immutability factor in the two-factor structure of sexual 
orientation beliefs described by Hegarty and Pratto (2001), which contained items 
reflecting early determinacy and adult fixity of sexual orientation. This factor of the 
SOBS also is similar to the immutability factor that Haslam and Levy (2007), in their 
work on sexual orientation beliefs, characterized as representing beliefs that sexual 
orientation is biologically based and fixed early in life. Furthermore, the Naturalness 
factor of the SOBS relates to the natural kinds factors found in other work examining 
essentialist beliefs about social groups generally (i.e., not sexual orientation in particular; 
e.g., Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). Thus, the Naturalness factor of the SOBS 
relates closely to prior findings in the literature. For this factor, the label “Naturalness” 
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was chosen over “immutability” as used in prior work (Haslam & Levy; Hegarty & 
Pratto), because it was believed to better account for the range of beliefs reflected in the 
items, including those addressing the cultural and temporal universality of sexual 
orientation.  
It is notable that the Naturalness factor consisted not only of essentialist items, but 
also of two items generated to reflect social constructionist beliefs (e.g., “Social and 
environmental factors are the main basis of an individual’s sexual orientation”) and two 
items intended to reflect agentic beliefs about sexual orientation (e.g., “People have 
control over changing or keeping their sexual orientation”). These items had an inverse 
relationship to the other items on the scale, suggesting that these beliefs function as 
oppositional to the essentialist beliefs. In other words, greater endorsement of social 
influence or personal choice in sexual orientation is related to lower levels of belief in its 
innateness, and vice-versa. Though social constructionism and essentialism frequently are 
treated as opposite ends of a philosophical or epistemological spectrum (Hansell, 2000), 
this study sought to investigate a variety of belief types without postulating potential 
relationships between them a priori. Interestingly, though, these results provide 
preliminary empirical support for the idea that at least some social constructionist and 
essentialist lay beliefs may effectively be “opposites.” Likewise, the negative relationship 
between agentic beliefs and essentialist beliefs in this factor suggest that at the level of 
individual lay beliefs, sexual orientation may tend to be perceived as either a forced or 





The second factor of the SOBS, Discreteness, was comprised of items reflecting 
beliefs that sexual orientation groupings (e.g., gay, heterosexual) are unique, non-
overlapping categories, wherein an individual’s membership is restricted to only one 
group. In prior empirical work on sexual orientation beliefs, items related to the 
essentialist construct of discreteness have been found to load on the same factor as the 
items related to entitativity or groupness (Haslam & Levy, 2007; Hegarty & Pratto, 
2001). In the present study, however, these items were found to load on a distinct factor. 
In addition to items generated specifically to reflect essentialist beliefs related to 
discreteness, this factor also was comprised of items intended to consider the social 
constructionist concept of fluidity. As was the case in the Naturalness factor, the social 
constructionist items loaded negatively on the Discreteness factor. This again points to 
the possibility that some lay social constructionist beliefs run counter to popular 
essentialist beliefs. While at the item level this can be fairly intuitive—that is, it is not 
surprising that level of endorsement of the item, “A person has only one true sexual 
orientation” would be negatively related to level of endorsement of the item, “People may 
reasonably identify as two sexual orientations at the same time”—it points to a 
potentially larger relationship between essentialist and social constructionist beliefs that 
is suggested in the theoretical literature but lacking in empirical evidence.  
Another point to be made related to this factor concerns the implicit working 
conceptualizations of discreteness in prior studies on sexual orientation beliefs. In these 
studies, discreteness was defined as reflective of a belief in two distinct (and perhaps 
opposite) sexualities, “homosexual” and “heterosexual.” This particular idea is not unlike 
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essentialist beliefs about gender that group individuals in one of two opposite-sexed 
categories. However, it is possible that lay beliefs in the discreteness of sexual orientation 
do not necessarily require belief in a binary. For example, essentialist beliefs about race 
may dictate that a person belongs to one, clearly-defined racial group; however, such 
beliefs do not inherently require the assertion that only two racial groups exist. Rather, an 
individual may adhere to essentialist ideas about racial categories and be able to identify 
three, four, five or more racial groups as potentially real and distinct. Likewise, when 
extrapolating to research on sexual orientation, it is interesting to note that the prior 
studies did not allow for the possibility that people may endorse three rather than two 
discrete sexual orientation groupings: homosexual (or gay/lesbian), bisexual, and 
heterosexual. While this may seem a small semantic point, it may also be reflective of a 
common bias that conceptualizes bisexuality as “half gay, half straight” or a transitional 
midpoint on the way to one’s “real” sexual orientation (Rust, 2000). In the present study, 
this issue was explored by providing participants with three separate but related items. 
Each item began with an identical stem, “Sexual orientation is a category with distinct 
boundaries,” followed by three different endings: one that specified a three-group view of 
sexual orientation (i.e., “a person is either gay/lesbian, bisexual, or heterosexual”), one 
that specified a two-group view of sexual orientation (i.e., “a person is either gay/lesbian 
or heterosexual”), and one that did not specify a number of groups but used the dominant 
identification as a referent (i.e., “a person is either heterosexual or not”). Interestingly, 
these items were differentially endorsed by participants. It was noted that the three-group 
item had the highest level of endorsement among participants ( x  = 1.86, sd = 1.02), 
followed by the two-group item ( x  = 1.70, sd = .88), and finally, the heterosexual-only 
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item ( x  = 1.55, sd = .81). In the final 35-item version of the SOBS, the first two of these 
items were retained and had similarly high loadings on the Discreteness factor (.79 and 
.75). Future work on beliefs about sexual orientation would benefit from increased 
attention to the varying conceptualizations of the groupings of sexual orientation and 
particularly to attitudes and beliefs about bisexuality. Indeed, useful information about 
sexual orientation beliefs may be lost when researchers implicitly reinforce a sexual 
orientation binary, particularly those endorsed by individuals who self-label as bisexual 
or queer (see also the discussion of within-group differences in beliefs related to sexual 
orientation below). 
Entitativity 
The third factor of the SOBS, Entitativity, included beliefs in the “groupness” of 
sexual orientation categories (i.e., the interconnectedness of members), as well as the 
informativeness of the category label for knowing or understanding the individual 
member, or what Rothbart and Taylor (1992) termed “inductive potential.” No social 
constructionist or agentic items loaded on this factor.  
As noted previously, in their work on essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation, 
Hegarty and Pratto (2001) described a “fundamentality” factor that included beliefs about 
discreteness as well as the informativeness of the sexual orientation label. Haslam and 
Levy (2007) likewise obtained a factor in their studies that reflected both discreteness 
beliefs and informativeness beliefs (a factor they labeled “discreteness”). Thus, while 
entitativity beliefs have been discussed in prior work on lay theories of sexual orientation, 
these typically have loaded on the same factor as discreteness beliefs. This suggests a 
potential difference of the present study results from prior findings. Results in the present 
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study suggested that the Entitativity factor was best conceptualized as distinct from 
Discreteness items, in contrast to prior work on sexual orientation beliefs, in which these 
constructs formed one factor. One possibility is that the greater length of the present 
measure allowed an important distinction between these factors to emerge.  
Social and Personal Importance 
 The fourth factor of the SOBS was labeled personal and social importance. The 
items loading on this factor appeared to converge around beliefs in the relative 
significance of the sexual orientation group membership, either for the individual on a 
personal level or for the individual in her or his social interactions. Most of the items in 
this subscale were written to reflect essentialist themes, including that of importance. 
Two items were intended to reflect social constructionist themes attending to the 
significance of context and issues of power related to sexual orientation self-labeling. 
One of these items (i.e., “Using terms like ‘lesbian,’ ‘gay,’ ‘bisexual,’ and ‘heterosexual’ 
only reinforces stereotypes”) loaded negatively on the factor. The issue of social and 
personal importance of group membership can be interpreted in a variety of ways. For 
example, one could hold a belief that sexual orientation is important because it is a 
fundamental attribute of a human being (an essentialist viewpoint). Quite differently, one 
could have a belief that sexual orientation is important because it is utilized as a tool of 
social oppression (a social constructionist belief). Alternatively, one could endorse a 
belief that sexual orientation is important because self-labeling reflects a process of self-
construction that highlights personal power and choice (an agentic belief). Consideration 
of the items on the scale and their factor loadings may reflect this potential divide. The 
first two items in the subscale, which simply reflect a general belief that sexual 
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orientation is important without stipulation about how or why, were found to have 
notably higher loadings on the factor than the remaining items, which asserted the 
importance of sexual orientation for knowing people, grouping people, or conferring 
social power to people. It would be beneficial for future work in this domain to attend 
more closely to these different ways of finding importance in sexual orientation and to 
attempt to differentiate between them. In the absence of that information, the Importance 
remains difficult to adequately interpret. 
Social Constructionist and Agentic Beliefs within the SOBS 
While the present study was designed to incorporate and evaluate potential non-
essentialist beliefs about social groups, ultimately, few social constructionist and agentic 
belief items are reflected in the final 35-item SOBS measure. Moreover, where these 
items appear in the current measure, they largely function as oppositional to essentialist 
beliefs and serve as reverse coded items for the factors on which they load. Many of the 
social constructionist items generated for this study were found to be confusing or 
complicated by the expert reviewers, and the social constructionist items tested in the 
main study frequently had poorer psychometric qualities than the essentialist belief items. 
Furthermore, the retained social constructionist items do not reflect the full range of 
social constructionist themes outlined in the preceding review of the literature (e.g., 
plurality). Thus, while the present study investigated a broader range of beliefs about 
sexual orientation than previous studies that addressed essentialist beliefs exclusively, 
results may suggest that some social constructionist themes are conceptually unrelated to 




Research Question 1: What is the relationship between beliefs about sexual 
orientation and right-wing authoritarianism? 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between beliefs about sexual 
orientation and need for cognitive structure? 
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between beliefs about sexual 
orientation and collective self esteem? 
Research Question 4: What is the relationship between demographic variables of 
participants and scores in the SOBS? 
Analyses conducted in the present study revealed a low to moderate relationship 
between the right wing authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 2006) and the subscales 
of the SOBS. This finding suggests that the created measure is not simply a new measure 
of authoritarianism. The largest relationship between the SOBS subscales and the RWA 
was a significant, positive correlation between RWA and scores on the Discreteness scale 
of the SOBS (r = .28, p < .01). This finding may be understood in terms of the cognitive 
requirements of authoritarianism. That is, authoritarianism requires the mental dividing of 
people into groups in order to confer a privileged status upon one and a denigrated status 
upon the other(s). Therefore, it is unsurprising that higher levels of right-wing 
authoritarianism were related to higher levels of endorsement in the discreteness of 
sexual orientation. 
Small correlations were also found between the subscales of the SOBS and the 
Personal Need for Structure scale (PNS; Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1989) scale. 
All relationships were positive and significant at the .05 level. The relationship between 
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sexual orientation beliefs and the need for cognitive structure was examined because 
different types of beliefs may provide a relatively more or less simple structure for 
understanding the differences between social groups. It is interesting to note that for the 
present sample, desire for structure and endorsement of essentialist beliefs were not 
found to be highly interrelated. One potential explanation for this finding may relate to 
the ways in which one arrives at beliefs about an in-group as opposed to an out-group. 
Previous studies have focused on heterosexual people’s beliefs about sexual orientation, 
which may largely be informed by stereotypes about sexual minority people that are 
cognitively simple. However, the present study sampled sexual minority individuals, who 
may be less apt to engage in cognitively reductive strategies for explicating sexual 
orientation, and draw instead on personal experiences and relationships that are 
cognitively more complex. Thus, endorsement of essentialist beliefs about sexuality by a 
sexual minority individual may be less apt to reflect a need for cognitive structure than 
would endorsement of the same belief by a sexual majority group member. 
Research Question 3 considered the relationship between sexual orientation 
beliefs and collective self esteem as measured by the Collective Self Esteem Scale 
(CSES; Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992). Even where statistically significant correlations 
were found, these were largely quite small. Two moderate, positive relationships were 
revealed, however: between the total CSES score and the Importance factor of the SOBS 
(r = .32, p < .01), and between the CSES Identity subscale and the SOBS Importance 
subscale (r= .49, p < .01). Collective self esteem considers the extent to which people feel 
positively about their social groups. This positive feeling may relate to the individual’s 
appreciation of her or his social groups, and/or the individual’s sense of herself or himself 
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as a member of those social groups. In the present study, participants were specifically 
directed to consider their sexual orientation group membership in responding to the 
items. Thus, the relationship between the total CSES score and the Personal and Social 
Importance scale of the SOBS is understandable because it suggests that those who 
believe that sexual orientation is a socially meaningful attribute are more likely to have 
positive feelings about their sexual orientation group membership. The CSES Identity 
subscale specifically focuses on the importance of one’s social group memberships to 
one’s self concept, and so the significant relationship between scores on this subscale and 
the Importance factor of the SOBS are likewise unsurprising.  
 Research Question 4 explored the possible relationships between 
sociodemographic characteristics of respondents and beliefs about sexual orientation. 
Differences related to participant gender, sexual orientation, and other demographic 
variables are discussed below  
Gender Differences  
For all factors on the SOBS, scores for women and men differed significantly, 
with women’s mean scores lower than men’s on all factors. While these differences were 
statistically significant, only the differences on the Naturalness factor demonstrated a 
medium effect size (η2 = .13; Cohen, 1988). Thus, women in the present study sample 
were less likely than men to identify sexual orientation as biologically based, immutable, 
and fixed early in life. This is consistent with other findings in the literature. For 
example, Rust (2000) noted that women are more likely than men to endorse multiple 
sexual orientation labels concurrently, to report changes in their sexual orientation self-
labeling over time, and to emphasize choice in sexual orientation. Thus, it follows 
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naturally that women may be less apt to view sexual orientation as innate and unchanging 
than do men, as such a belief may be less consistent, or inconsistent, with their personal 
experiences of sexuality.   
Sexual Orientation Differences 
 Potential relationships between sexual orientation self-labeling and scores on the 
SOBS were investigated. No statistically significant differences were found for the 
Importance factor. That is, participants were no more (nor less) likely to endorse the 
personal or social importance of sexual orientation based on their own membership in a 
specific sexual orientation category. Differences in mean scores were found on the 
Entitativity factor of the SOBS, with gay-identified participants having higher mean 
scores than queer-identified participants; however, the effect size of this finding was very 
small. Thus, there was some indication that gay individuals attribute greater similarity 
and informativeness to sexual orientation groupings than do queer individuals; however, 
this finding may lack in practical significance. 
More sizable differences were found between sexual orientation groups on the 
Naturalness and Discreteness factors. Specifically, on the Naturalness factor, gay 
respondents had significantly higher mean scores than bisexual, lesbian, or queer 
participants (p < .001); lesbian participants had significantly higher scores than queer 
participants (p < .001); and bisexual participants had significantly higher scores than 
queer participants (p = .016). On the Discreteness factor, gay respondents had 
significantly higher mean scores than bisexual or queer participants (p < .001), and 
lesbian participants had significantly higher scores than bisexual or queer participants (p 
< .001). Taken collectively, these findings suggest a trend whereby gay and lesbian 
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participants had higher mean endorsement of Naturalness and Discreteness beliefs than 
did bisexual or queer participants. That queer and bisexual identified individuals may be 
less likely to endorse essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation is consistent with 
empirical and theoretical work suggesting that the very claiming of bisexual and queer 
labels is personally and socially more difficult than self-identifying as lesbian or gay 
(e.g., Rust, 2002; 2000). Binegative attitudes both in and out of the sexual minority 
community confer a dubious status on bisexually-identified individuals. Specifically, 
bisexuality is often described as transitional, temporary, or reflective of confusion or 
dishonesty on the part of its claimant (and therefore not Natural, nor Discrete). To accept 
a bisexual self-label requires the rejection of this binegative discourse, and perhaps 
concomitantly, lower adherence to sexual orientation beliefs most closely associated with 
that discourse. Likewise, some individuals embrace the self-label “queer” to convey a 
refusal to organize their experiences within traditional, confining conceptualizations of 
sexuality that do not match their personal experiences (Fassinger & Arseneau, 2007). 
This rejection of normative ideas about sexuality could in turn relate to a lower likelihood 
of endorsing sexual orientation beliefs focused on immutability, inherence, and 
discreteness. 
Other Demographic Differences 
Relationship between age, SES, education, and geographic area or residence (i.e., 
suburban, urban, rural) were explored. 
Subjective self-assessment of social class was provided by participants on a 10-
point scale; these ratings were correlated with SOBS scores. One significant correlation 
was found for the Importance factor; however, this relationship was found to be small 
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and significant only at the .05 level. Thus, social class/SES appears to have little 
influence on endorsement of lay beliefs about sexual orientation. For example, social 
standing alone was not significantly related to individual beliefs that sexual orientation is 
innate or biologically driven. Furthermore, no significant differences in SOBS scores 
were revealed among participants residing in differing geographic settings (i.e., rural, 
suburban, urban). Recently, some of the influences of “gay ghettos” on the lived 
experiences of sexual minority individuals have been described in the literature, and 
attention has been given to unique challenges of sexual minority individuals living in 
small towns and rural areas who may have difficulty accessing a community (e.g., Mills 
et al., 2001). It is therefore interesting to note that sexual orientation beliefs did not 
appear to vary according to geographic area of residence in the present study. 
Correlational analysis was also conducted between scores on the SOBS subscales 
and age. Age was significantly correlated with scores on three of the four factors of the 
SOBS (Naturalness, Discreteness, and Importance), though these relationships were 
found to be small. Nevertheless, some evidence was provided that beliefs about sexual 
orientation may differ between older and younger sexual minority people, in that older 
individuals perceived sexual orientation as more inherent, immutable, distinct, and 
important than did younger sexual minority people. In considering age-related differences 
with sexual minority people, the potential significance of cohort effects must be 
considered (Fassinger & Arseneau, 2007). Social attitudes about sexual orientation have 
changed dramatically in the past decades and older sexual minority individuals may have 
experienced greater stigma than their younger counterparts. Savin-Williams (2005) 
recently found that sexual minority youth are less likely to embrace sexual orientation 
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labels used by older sexual minority individuals, and are generally less interested in self-
labeling based on sexual orientation. This provides some support for the idea that sexual 
orientation beliefs may reflect cohort attitudes, and specifically, that younger people may 
hold less essentialist views of sexual orientation and may view sexuality as less 
personally or socially important. No empirical literature was located which specifically 
examined age or cohort effects on essentialist beliefs about social groups. 
Finally, the relationships between highest level of education and scores on the 
SOBS subscales were assessed. A statistically significant difference reflective of a large 
effect size (η2 = .14) was revealed on the Importance factor, such that higher levels of 
education were associated with progressively higher means on this factor. The increasing 
endorsement of social and personal importance of sexual orientation with increasing 
levels of education is difficult to account for, and again points to questions about the 
ultimate interpretability and utility of the Importance factor as obtained in this study. 
Limitations of the Present Study 
 The present study is characterized by several limitations which must be 
considered in evaluating its overall merit, generalizability of findings, and potential 
utility for future counseling psychology research and practice. Significant limitations of 
this project are detailed in this section. Where relevant, unique strengths of the current 
project are also noted. 
 Several limitations, as well as some strengths, may be found in issues related to 
sampling procedures and the eventual sample obtained in the study. This project sought 
to investigate beliefs about sexual orientation held by sexual minority individuals; in 
doing so, it expanded the literature on essentialist beliefs in what may be an important 
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direction. Centering the experience of traditionally marginalized groups is an important 
aspect of multicultural research that may both inform psychologists about the lives of 
nondominant group members and also give rise to new perspectives in work with 
dominant (or mixed) populations. Thus, the focus on sexual orientation beliefs held by 
sexual minority individuals could be viewed as a unique strength of this project. 
Nevertheless, as frequently is the case in psychological research generally and in online 
research specifically, the obtained sample was predominantly White and highly educated. 
This may limit the generalizability of the current results to the broader population of 
same-gender attracted individuals, and raises the issue of potential sociodemographic-
related confounds in the data. Of course, Worthington and Whittaker (2006) make the 
important point that in research with LGBT people, it is difficult to assess 
representativeness of a sample or make claims about generalizability because attributes of 
the actual population remain unknown, due to the oppression of this minority group. 
Although specific efforts were made to recruit a diverse sample that would be more 
racially/ethnically diverse, people of color represented just over 20% over the study 
sample. A largely White and highly educated sample may produce a range restriction on 
variables of interest in the project, which ultimately could compromise the findings.  
The sampling procedures appear to have been reasonably effective at obtaining a 
sample that was diverse with respect to demographic characteristics such as age, 
geographic location, and sexual orientation self-labeling. In this latter category the 
characteristics of the sample are particularly noteworthy, in that over 16% percent of the 
participants labeled as bisexual and 13% self-described as queer. Both the recruitment 
materials with language specifically recruiting “same-gender attracted people” rather than 
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“LGB people” may have helped in this regard, along with the demographic questionnaire 
which somewhat atypically allowed for self labeling as queer. (Indeed, this researcher 
was pleased to receive positive feedback from participants about the sexual orientation 
and gender identity questions on the demographics form, which when constructed in a 
more traditional manner can serve to marginalize and inaccurately represent individuals.) 
Ultimately, results obtained in the present study should be extrapolated with caution to a 
larger sexual minority population. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the created 
SOBS will have utility in assessing the beliefs of sexual majority individuals. 
In addition, it should be noted that the use of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
has several limitations. EFA frequently has been described in the literature as a process 
which runs the risk of being characterized by “garbage in, garbage out” (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). This expression refers to the fact that factors are determined by and depend 
on the quality of the items created. A lengthy scale constructed of poor items still may 
produce psychometrically reasonable factors through this analytic technique. To attempt 
to offset this potential—and significant—problem, several best practice recommendations 
were followed during the item generation phase of measure development to ensure that 
the items subjected to factor analysis were of reasonable quality and representative of 
content validity.  
Furthermore, the process selecting the number of factors to extract and the 
naming of factors are highly subjective in exploratory factor analysis. Though guidelines 
certainly exist for factor retention (e.g., Kahn, 2006; Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987; 
Worthington & Whittaker, 2006), ultimately, the four factor solution described in this 
document represents a solution of the data rather than the solution. Likewise, factor 
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names, while informed by their component items as well as constructs derived from the 
literature, invariably reflect the particular viewpoint of the researcher. Furthermore, the 
use of a single sample to explore the factor structure of a new scale, without replicating 
the factor structure on a confirmation sample, allows for the possibility that findings were 
obtained by chance or that the described factor structure is unstable. Consequently, this 
study should be viewed as exploratory and its results as prospective. 
 An additional limitation of the present study relates to the need for establishment 
of concurrent, discriminant, and predictive validity of the new measure. While item 
generation and vetting processes were utilized following recommendations for 
maximizing content validity in scale development (Kahn, 2006; Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987; 
Worthington & Whittaker, 2006), claims of the construct validity of the SOBS would 
need additional support. Some support for the discriminant validity of the SOBS was 
found with an established measure of right wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 2006). 
However, predictive and concurrent validity were not assessed in the current project 
based. Interpretation of the present results should attend to this limitation, and future 
work will benefit from reconsideration of these validity issues. 
Implications for Research and Practice 
 Consideration of the implications of the present study for counseling psychology 
is important to assessing its ultimate utility and merit. In this section, potential future 
directions for research and professional practice are presented.  
First, it is recommended that future research be conducted to further evaluate the 
psychometric properties of the Sexual Orientation Beliefs Scale (SOBS). A next initial 
step in this process may be a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on a new sample to test 
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the stability of the factor structure. CFA is a measurement tool used to confirm that a 
hypothesized factor structure, specified a priori, provides a good fit to a given data set 
(Kahn, 2006). In CFA, hypotheses are derived from a theory postulating the relationships 
among constructs and observed variables.  
Future research in this domain would also benefit from consideration of potential 
correlates of the sexual orientation belief factors obtained in the SOBS. A measure is 
useful to the extent that it predicts relationships with or differentiates between other 
constructs of interest. The potential relationship of sexual orientation beliefs to political 
conservatism, religious fundamentalism, personal self-esteem, or social activism could be 
fruitful areas of investigation. 
 Finally, the social constructionist constructs articulated in the current project were 
not well represented in the final measure. It is possible that these concepts were poorly 
reduced to Likert-type items in a quantitative project. Many of these themes were found 
to be complex even by expert reviewers. Qualitative methodologies might provide a 
better means of investigating the level and type of endorsement of social constructionist 
views about sexual orientation held by sexual minority people. 
It would be difficult to argue that there are immediate implications for practice 
from the present study, as support for the validity of the developed measure would first 
need to be established through additional research. However, continued research on 
sexual orientation beliefs and the further refinement and testing of the SOBS may 
ultimately link to professional practice issues. For example, Reynolds and Hanjorgiris 
(2000) have noted that sexual minority individuals seek therapy in greater numbers than 
their heterosexual counterparts. Lay beliefs about sexual orientation may be related to 
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individual sexual minority clients’ self concepts or personal self-esteem. Having an 
appropriate knowledge of issues that impinge upon healthy identity development for 
sexual minority individuals is critical to providing affirmative and ethical services. 
Research that delineates group-related beliefs could provide counselors with a tool with 
which to engage the identity-related experiences of sexual minority individuals. 
Furthermore, in couples or family practice, an understanding of personal differences in 
beliefs about sexual orientation may facilitate a therapeutic dialogue about individual 
assumptions, and enable practitioners to assist in the bridging of interpersonal gaps 
between clients. Additionally, exploration of therapist-client match on belief structures 
could yield new information relevant to maximizing therapeutic outcomes. Finally, 
whereas much recent social policy and advocacy work on behalf of sexual minority 
individuals draws explicitly or implicitly on lay beliefs about sexual orientation, a more 
thorough understanding of the nature and function of these beliefs could eventually 
provide needed support to those psychologists and activists working to advance a social 
justice agenda.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to explore the nature of lay beliefs about sexual 
orientation held by sexual minority individuals through creation of the Sexual Orientation 
Beliefs Scale (SOBS). Essentialist, social constructionist, and agentic theory and research 
were utilized to inform the scale development process. The final 35-item SOBS consisted 
of four factors which were named by the researcher as reflecting beliefs about 
Naturalness, Discreteness, Entitativity, and Personal and Social Importance of sexual 
orientation. Results suggested that variations may exist in the types and levels of beliefs 
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endorsed by sexual minority adults based on the gender and sexual orientation self-
labeling of the individual. Continued empirical research in this area is needed to further 
illuminate the nature and correlates of such beliefs, and perhaps ultimately to help bridge 
the gap between beliefs about sexual orientation and the pressing psychological, social, 
and legal issues to which they are connected.
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APPENDIX A 
Items from Prior Studies for Review in Item Generation 
Items Specifically Focused on Sexual Orientation 
From Haslam & Levy, 2007: 
1. Sexual orientations are categories with clear and sharp boundaries: People are either 
homosexual or heterosexual. 
2.  Homosexual people a necessary or defining characteristic, without which they would 
not be homosexual. 
3.  Heterosexual and homosexual people are not fundamentally different. (R)  
4. Bisexual people are fooling themselves and should make up their minds.  
5.  Knowing that someone is homosexual or heterosexual tells you a lot about them.  
6.  Sexual orientation is caused by biological factors. 
7.  Whether a person is homosexual or heterosexual is pretty much set early on in 
childhood. 
8.  People cannot change their sexual orientation. (R) 
9.  Homosexuality and heterosexuality are innate, genetically based tendencies.  
10. Doctors and psychologists can help people change their sexual orientation. (R)  
11. Homosexuals probably only exist in certain cultures. (R) 
12. Homosexuals have probably existed throughout human history. 
13. In all cultures there are people who consider themselves homosexual.  
14. The proportion of the population that is homosexual is roughly the same all over the 
world.  
15. It is only in the last century that homosexuals have appeared in large numbers. (R) 
 
From Hegarty & Pratto, 2001: 
1.  Sexual orientation is caused by biological factors such as genes and hormones. 
2.  Whether a person is homosexual or heterosexual is pretty much set early on in 
childhood. 
3.  If you didn’t know a person’s sexual orientation you couldn’t really say that you 
know that person. 
4.  Homosexual relationships are fundamentally different from heterosexual 
relationships. 
5.  Regardless of their past experience some people can choose to change their sexual 
orientation. 
6.  Doctors and psychologists can help people change their sexual orientation. 
7.  If someone comes out as gay or lesbian they were probably attracted to the same sex 
all along. 
8.  Bisexual people are fooling themselves and should make up their minds. 





Items from Other Studies of Essentialist Beliefs 
From Bastian & Haslam, 2006: 
1. The kind of person someone is can be largely attributed to their genetic inheritance. 
2. Very few traits that people exhibit can be traced back to their biology. (R) 
3. I think that genetic predispositions have little influence on the kind of person 
someone is. (R) 
4. Whether someone is one kind of person or another is determined by their biological 
make-up.  
5. There are different types of people and with enough scientific knowledge these 
different ‘types’ can be traced back to genetic causes. 
6. A person’s attributes are something that can’t be attributed to their biology. (R) 
7. With enough scientific knowledge, the basic qualities that a person has could be 
traced back to, and explained by, their biological make-up. 
8. A person’s traits are never determined by their genes. (R) 
9. The kind of person someone is, is clearly defined; they either are a certain kind of 
person or they are not. 
10. People can behave in ways that seem ambiguous, but the central aspects of their 
character are clear-cut. 
11. A person’s basic qualities exist in varying degrees, and are never easily categorized. 
(R) 
12. Everyone is either a certain type of person or they are not. 
13. A person’s basic character is never easily defined. (R) 
14. A person either has a certain attribute or they do not. 
15. No matter what qualities a person has, those qualities are always indefinite and 
difficult to define. (R)  
16. People can have many attributes and are never completely defined by any particular 
one. (R) 
17. When getting to know a person it is possible to get a picture of the kind of person 
they are very quickly. 
17. It is possible to know about many aspects of a person once you become familiar with 
a few of their basic traits. 
18. A person’s behavior in a select number of contexts can never tell you a lot about the 
kind of person they are. (R)  
19. Although a person may have some basic identifiable traits, it is never easy to make 
accurate judgments about how they will behave in different situations. (R) 
20. Generally speaking, once you know someone in one or two contexts it is possible to 
predict how they will behave in most other contexts. 
21. It is never possible to judge how someone will react in new social situations. (R)  
22. There are different ‘types’ of people and it is possible to know what ‘type’ of person 
someone is relatively quickly. 
 
From Demoulin et al., 2006: 
1.   Some categories can qualify as ‘groups,’ some categories qualify to a lesser extent.  
2.   In some categories, people interact very much with one another. In some, there is 
almost no interaction between members of the category.  
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3.  Some categories are very important in the eyes of the people that are part of it. Some 
have no importance at all in their eyes. 
4.  In some categories, members of the category share with one another common fate. In 
some categories, members are not linked by a common fate.  
5.  In some categories, members of the category pursue common goals. In some 
categories, members are not linked by any common goals.  
6.  Some categories allow people to make many judgments about their members; 
knowing that someone belongs to the category tells us a lot about that person. Other 
categories only allow a few judgments about their members; knowledge of 
membership is not very informative.  
7.  Some categories contain members who are very similar to one another; they have 
many things in common. Other categories contain members who differ greatly from 
one another, and don’t share many characteristics.  
8.  Some categories have sharper boundaries than others. For some, membership is clear-
cut, definite, and of ‘either/or’ variety; people belong to the category or they do not. 
For others, membership is more ‘fuzzy’; people belong to the category in varying 
degrees.  
9. Some categories are more natural than others, whereas others are more artificial.  
10. Membership in some categories is easy to change; it is easy for group members to 
become non-members. Membership in other categories is relatively immutable; it is 
difficult for category members to become non-members.  
11. Some categories are more stable over time than others; they have always existed and 
their characteristics have not changed much throughout history. Other categories are 
less stable; their characteristics have changed substantially over time, and they may 
not always have existed.  
12. Some categories have necessary features or characteristics; without these 
characteristics someone cannot be a category member. Other categories have many 
similarities but no features or characteristics are necessary for membership.  
13. Some categories have an underlying reality. Although members have similarities and 
differences on the surface, underneath they are basically the same. Other categories 
also have many similarities and differences on the surface, but do not correspond to 
an underlying reality.  
14. In some cases, we feel that members of a category all possess something that 
convincingly explains membership in the category even if it is rather abstract. In 
some other cases, explaining membership in the category does not seem that easy. 
15. Membership in some categories seems to be due to some immaterial thing that, even 
if it is hard to say what, is at the same time very real. For some other categories, we 
don’t have the impression that we can spot some immaterial thing that explains 
membership in the category.  
16. Some categories have an explanative power. Something deep inside categories’ 
members explains membership of these individuals in the category. For other 
categories, nothing deep inside the members can explain membership in the category.  
17. For some categories, members seem to be linked with each other by some invisible 




From Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000: 
1. Some categories have sharper boundaries than others. For some, membership is clear-
cut, definite, and of an “either-or” variety; people either belong to the category or 
they do not. For others, membership is more “fuzzy”; people belong to the category in 
varying degrees.  
2. Some categories contain members who are very similar to one another; they have 
many things in common. Members of these categories are relatively uniform. Other 
categories contain members who differ greatly from one another, and don’t share 
many characteristics. 
3. Some categories allow people to make many judgments about their members; 
knowing that someone belongs to the category tells us a lot about that person. Other 
categories only allow a few judgments about their members; knowledge of 
membership is not very informative. 
4. Some categories are more natural than others, whereas others are more artificial.
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APPENDIX B 
Initial Item Pool Reviewed by Experts 
1. Sexual orientations are categories with clear boundaries: A person is either 
heterosexual or not. 
2. Sexual orientations are categories with distinct boundaries: A person is either 
lesbian/gay, bisexual, or heterosexual.   
3. Sexual orientations are categories with distinct boundaries: A person is either 
gay/lesbian or heterosexual.    
4. There are no distinct boundaries between sexual orientation groups. 
5. People belong to sexual orientation categories in varying degrees. 
6. Sexual orientation categories have "fuzzy" boundaries. 
7. It is possible to be “partially” or “somewhat” gay or lesbian. 
8. People who claim to be bisexual are fooling themselves and should make up their 
minds. 
9. People who identify as bisexual are confused about their true sexual orientation. 
10. Bisexual people eventually choose between being straight and being gay/lesbian.    
11. People with different sexual orientations are not fundamentally different. 
12. People who have the same sexual orientation are very similar to one another. 
13. People with the same sexual orientation differ greatly from one another. 
14. There are more differences than similarities among people who label themselves 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual. 
15. There are more differences than similarities among people who call themselves 
lesbian. 
16. There are more differences than similarities among people who call themselves gay. 
17. Knowing a person’s sexual orientation tells you a lot about them. 
18. If you didn’t know a person’s sexual orientation you couldn’t really say that you 
know that person. 
19. It is possible to know about many aspects of a person once you know her or his 
sexual orientation. 
20. Sexual orientation is innate and genetically based. 
21. Sexual orientation is innate and biologically based. 
22. Sexual orientation is caused by biological factors such as genes and hormones. 
23. There is a “gay gene.” 
24. Variation in sexual orientation is natural.   
25. Groupings like "gay" and "straight" are pretty artificial. 
26. Eventually it will be possible for scientific knowledge to explain the existence of 
different sexual orientations. 
27. With enough scientific knowledge, the sexual orientation that a person has could be 
traced back to, and explained by, their biological make-up. 
28. Diversity in sexual orientation can be found in animals other than humans. 
29. All people have a sexual orientation. 
30. A person’s sexual orientation is pretty much set early on in childhood. 
31. From the day you are born/early in life/early childhood your sexual orientation is 
exactly the way it will always be.    
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32. Treatments and therapies exist that can successfully change people’s sexual 
orientation.  
33. People cannot change their sexual orientation. 
34. It is impossible to truly change one’s sexual orientation 
35. People who are unhappy with their sexual orientation may successfully change it.    
36. People who are unhappy with their sexual orientation should make efforts to change 
it.    
37. If someone comes out as gay or lesbian they were probably attracted to the same sex 
all along. 
38. If someone comes out as gay, lesbian, or bisexual they were probably attracted to the 
same sex all along. 
39. People with/of different sexual orientations exist in all cultures. 
40. Different sexual orientations probably only exist in certain cultures. 
41. In all cultures there are people who are attracted to members of the same sex. 
42. People with/of different sex orientations have probably existed throughout history. 
43. The proportions of the population made up by different sexual orientation groups is 
roughly the same all over the world. 
44. It is only in the last century that differences in sexual orientation have appeared. 
45. Same-sex relationships are fundamentally different from heterosexual relationships. 
46. Although people with the same sexual orientation have some similarities and 
differences on the surface, underneath they are basically the same. 
47. People with the same sexual orientation share a necessary or defining characteristic, 
without which they would not belong to that group.  
48. A person has only one true sexual orientation. 
49. People who have the same sexual orientation choose to interact frequently with one 
another. 
50. Sexual orientation is an important personal characteristic. 
51. Sexual orientation is an important characteristic of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people. 
52. People with the same sexual orientation have similar life paths. 
53. People who share the same sexual orientation pursue common goals. 
54. The term sexual orientation is easy to define. 
55. It is usually possible to know a person's sexual orientation even without being told. 
56. Something deep inside of a person determines her or his sexual orientation. 
57. If people weren't interested in discussing sexual orientation it wouldn't exist. 
58. Sexual orientation labels are meaningful. 
59. Labels for sexual orientations change over time but the specific categories the labels 
represent do not. 
60. The idea that individuals have a "sexual orientation" is a social invention. 
61. People tend to/may identify their sexual orientation differently in different contexts. 
62. Terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," and "heterosexual" mean different things to 
different people. 
63. People may have different sexual orientations in different contexts. 
64. Using terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," and "heterosexual" does little more than 
foster stereotypes. 
65. An individual's sexual orientation is fluid and constantly changing. 
66. People may reasonably identify as two sexual orientations at the same time. 
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67. Most people are probably naturally bisexual. 
68. Sexual orientation can change over time. 
69. "Queer" is a sexual orientation that is different from lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
heterosexual. 
70. Sexual orientation does not exist outside of a person's relationship(s). 
71. A person's sexual behavior and true sexual orientation should match.  
72. People have access to different amounts of social power depending upon their sexual 
orientation. 
73. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual people experience equal discrimination. 
74. People probably choose sexual orientation labels for themselves in part based on how 
that group is viewed by others. 
75. Bisexual people have more social power than lesbian or gay people. 
76. An individual may choose a given sexual orientation for political reasons. 
77. Individuals choose their sexual orientation. 
78. People have no choice in their sexual orientation. 
79. Sexual orientation is at least in part a matter personal of preference. 
80. Other things may have some influence, but personal choice is the biggest reason for 
an individual’s sexual orientation. 
81. Other factors may have some influence, but biology is the biggest reason for an 
individual’s sexual orientation. 
82. Other factors may have some influence, but social and family factors are the biggest 
reason for an individual’s sexual orientation. 
83. A person's sexual orientation is caused by how he or she was raised. 
84. A person's sexual orientation reflects how God made that person. 
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APPENDIX C 
Pilot Study Items 
1. People who have the same sexual orientation are very similar to one another. 
2. Sexual orientation is a category with clear boundaries: A person is either heterosexual 
or not. 
3. It is possible to be “partially” or “somewhat” gay or lesbian.  
4. There are more similarities than differences among people who call themselves 
heterosexual. 
5. Sexual orientation is caused by biological factors such as genes or hormones. 
6. Diversity in sexual orientation can be found in animals other than humans. 
7. It is impossible to truly change one’s sexual orientation.  
8. In all cultures there are people who are attracted to members of the same sex. 
9. Although people with the same sexual orientation have some differences on the 
surface, underneath they are basically the same. 
10. People who have the same sexual orientation interact frequently with one another. 
11. People with different sexual orientations are destined to have different life paths. 
12. Even if it's hard to explain, we know what it means when a person tells us his or her 
sexual orientation. 
13. Individuals with the same sexual orientation seem to be connected to one another by 
some invisible link. 
14. People may identify their sexual orientation differently in different contexts. 
15. No matter where you are or who you are with, your sexual orientation stays the same. 
16. A person's sexual orientation can change over time.  
17. A person's sexual behavior should match his or her true sexual orientation. 
18. Bisexual people have more social power than lesbian or gay people. 
19. Other things may have some influence, but personal choice is the biggest reason for 
an individual’s sexual orientation. 
20. A person's sexual orientation is determined by the attitudes or values of his or her 
parent(s). 
21. It's possible for a person to belong more or less strongly to a given sexual orientation. 
22. Groupings like "gay" and "straight" are pretty artificial.  
23. Sexual orientation is not an important attribute.  
24. The idea that individuals have a "sexual orientation" is a social invention. 
25. Other factors may have some influence, but social and family factors are the biggest 
reason for an individual’s sexual orientation. 
26. People probably choose sexual orientation labels for themselves in part based on how 
that group is viewed by others. 
27. Particularly difficult or traumatic experiences may cause a change in an individual's 
sexual orientation. 
28. Sexual orientation is at least in part a matter personal of preference. 
29. An individual may choose a given sexual orientation for political reasons. 
30. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual people experience equal discrimination. 
31. Sexual orientation does not exist outside of a person's relationship(s). 
32. Using terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," and "heterosexual" only reinforces 
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stereotypes. 
33. Sexual orientation categories are meaningful.  
34. If people weren't interested in discussing sexual orientation, it wouldn't exist. 
35. The term "sexual orientation" is easy to define.  
36. People who share the same sexual orientation pursue common goals. 
37. Sexual orientation is an important characteristic of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people. 
38. People tend to have a sense of community or group belonging based on their sexual 
orientation. 
39. A person has only one true sexual orientation.  
40. Same-sex relationships are fundamentally different from heterosexual relationships. 
41. People with different sexual orientations have probably existed throughout history. 
42. If someone comes out as gay or lesbian they were probably attracted to the same sex 
all along. 
43. Treatments and therapies exist that can successfully change people’s sexual 
orientation. 
44. A person’s sexual orientation is pretty much set early on in childhood. 
45. There are more similarities than differences among people who label themselves 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual. 
46. People who identify as bisexual are confused about their true sexual orientation. 
47. Sexual orientation is a category with clear boundaries: A person is either lesbian/gay, 
bisexual, or heterosexual. 
48. People who claim to be bisexual are fooling themselves and should make up their 
minds. 
49. There are more similarities than differences among people who call themselves 
lesbians. 
50. Knowing a person’s sexual orientation tells you a lot about them.  
51. Sexual orientation is innate.  
52. The existence of different sexual orientations is natural.  
53. People who are unhappy with their sexual orientation may successfully change it. 
54. All people have a sexual orientation.  
55. It is only in the last century that differences in sexual orientation have appeared. 
56. Sexual orientation helps group people in important ways.  
57. Most people don't view their sexual orientation as important to them. 
58. People with different sexual orientations have different goals in life. 
59. Labels for sexual orientation may change over time but the specific categories the 
labels represent do not. 
60. People may have different sexual orientations in different contexts. 
61. Most people are probably naturally bisexual.  
62. "Queer" is a sexual orientation that is different from lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
heterosexual. 
63. People have no choice in their sexual orientation.  
64. Other factors may have some influence, but biology is the biggest reason for an 
individual’s sexual orientation. 
65. Something deep inside of a person determines her or his sexual orientation. 
66. People with different sexual orientations probably only exist in certain cultures. 
67. Sexual orientation is a category with distinct boundaries: A person is either 
120 
gay/lesbian or heterosexual. 
68. Bisexual people eventually choose between being straight and being gay/lesbian. 
69. People with the same sexual orientation differ greatly from one another. 
70. If you don’t know a person’s sexual orientation, you can’t really say that you know 
that person. 
71. There is a "gay gene."  
72. From early in life your sexual orientation is exactly the way it will always be. 
73. The proportions of the population made up by different sexual orientation groups is 
roughly the same all over the world. 
74. People with the same sexual orientation share a necessary or defining characteristic, 
without which they would not belong to that group. 
75. Sexual orientation is an important characteristic of people.  
76. People with the same sexual orientation share a common fate.  
77. It is usually possible to know a person's sexual orientation even without being told. 
78. Terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," and "heterosexual" mean different things to 
different people. 
79. A person's sexual orientation is fluid and can change.  
80. People may reasonably identify as two sexual orientations at the same time. 
81. People have access to different amounts of social power depending upon their sexual 
orientation. 
82. Sexual orientation is something that is chosen by people. 
83. There are no distinct boundaries or dividing lines between different sexual 
orientations. 
84. People with different sexual orientations are not fundamentally different. 
85. It is possible to know about many aspects of a person once you know her or his 
sexual orientation. 
86. People who are unhappy with their sexual orientation should make efforts to change 
it. 
87. There are more similarities than differences among people who call themselves gay. 
88. Eventually it will be possible for scientific knowledge to explain the existence of 
different sexual orientations. 
89. People with different sexual orientations do not tend to interact with one another. 
90. An individual's sexual orientation doesn't change.  




Sexual Orientation Belief Items Administered in the Main Study 
 
1. People who have the same sexual orientation are very similar to one another. 
2. Sexual orientation is innate. 
3. In all cultures there are people who are attracted to members of the same sex. 
4. Terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," and "heterosexual" mean different things to 
different people. 
5. Individuals choose their sexual orientation. 
6. People can experience either privilege or discrimination based on their sexual 
orientation. 
7. Most people are probably naturally bisexual. 
8. If people weren't interested in discussing sexual orientation, it wouldn't exist. 
9. Sexual orientation is a category with clear boundaries: A person is either heterosexual 
or not. 
10. Sexual orientation is set early on in life. 
11. Knowing a person’s sexual orientation tells you a lot about them. 
12. People may reasonably identify as two sexual orientations at the same time. 
13. Family influence is the main basis of an individual’s sexual orientation. 
14. Sexual orientation is an important characteristic of people. 
15. We know what it means when a person tells us his or her sexual orientation. 
16. People with different sexual orientations have different goals in life. 
17. Queer is a sexual orientation that is different from lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
heterosexual. 
18. It is usually possible to know a person's sexual orientation even without being told. 
19. There are more similarities than differences among people who have the same sexual 
orientation. 
20. Sexual orientation is caused by biological factors such as genes or hormones. 
21. People with different sexual orientations probably have existed throughout history. 
22. If you don’t know a person’s sexual orientation, you can’t really say that you know 
that person. 
23. A person's sexual orientation can change over time. 
24. Most people view their sexual orientation as important to them. 
25. People may have different sexual orientations in different contexts. 
26. The term "sexual orientation" is easy to define. 
27. People select the sexual orientation that best fits the life they want to live. 
28. The idea that individuals possess a sexual orientation is not based in reality. 
29. People have access to different amounts of social power depending upon their sexual 
orientation. 
30. Sexual orientation is a category with clear boundaries: A person is either gay/lesbian, 
bisexual, or heterosexual. 
31. Sexual orientation cannot be changed by treatments and therapies. 
32. People who have the same sexual orientation interact frequently with one another. 
33. Biology is the main basis of an individual’s sexual orientation. 
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34. People with the same sexual orientation share a necessary or defining characteristic, 
without which they would not belong to that group. 
35. People with the same sexual orientation share a common fate. 
36. People tend to have a sense of group belonging based on their sexual orientation. 
37. People with different sexual orientations are fundamentally different. 
38. There is a “gay gene.”  
39. The percentages of people in different sexual orientation groups are roughly the same 
all over the world. 
40. Your sexual orientation can change depending on who you are with or where you are. 
41. It is possible to know about many aspects of a person once you know her or his 
sexual orientation. 
42. Personal preference is the main basis of an individual’s sexual orientation. 
43. The idea that individuals have a "sexual orientation" is a social invention. 
44. Sexual orientation is a category with distinct boundaries: A person is either 
gay/lesbian or heterosexual. 
45. People probably choose sexual orientation labels for themselves in part based on how 
that group is viewed by others. 
46. An individual's sexual orientation does not change. 
47. A person's sexual orientation is an important attribute. 
48. Sexual orientation does not exist outside of a person's relationship(s). 
49. People who share the same sexual orientation pursue common goals. 
50. Difficult or traumatic experiences have no effect on sexual orientation. 
51. Individuals with the same sexual orientation seem to be connected to one another by 
some invisible link. 
52. Same-sex relationships are fundamentally different from heterosexual relationships. 
53. A person has only one true sexual orientation. 
54. It's useful to group people according to their sexual orientation. 
55. Although people with the same sexual orientation have some differences on the 
surface, underneath they are basically the same. 
56. The existence of different sexual orientations is natural. 
57. Using terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," and "heterosexual" only reinforces 
stereotypes. 
58. People have control over changing or keeping their sexual orientation. 
59. It is possible to be “partially” or “somewhat” gay or straight. 
60. People with different sexual orientations are destined to have different life paths. 
61. People who identify as bisexual are confused about their true sexual orientation. 
62. All people have a sexual orientation. 
63. A person may claim a given sexual orientation for political reasons. 
64. Groupings like "gay" and "straight" are pretty artificial. 
65. It is impossible to truly change one’s sexual orientation. 
66. Social and environmental factors are the main basis of an individual’s sexual 
orientation. 
67. People with different sexual orientations do not tend to interact with one another. 
68. If someone comes out as gay or lesbian they were probably attracted to the same sex 
all along. 
69. Something deep inside of a person determines her or his sexual orientation. 
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70. A person's sexual orientation is revealed by their sexual relationships. 





Please answer the following questions about yourself as honestly as possible. Remember 
that your answers will be kept CONFIDENTIAL by the researchers.  
 
1. Age:  ___________________ 
 
2. Your race/ethnicity:  
 African American/Black  
 Asian/East Asian American/Pacific Islander  
 Hispanic/Latino/Chicano  
 Middle Eastern/Arab American  
 Native American/American Indian  
 South Asian American/Indian  
 White/Caucasian  
 Multi-Racial or Other (please specify): _____________________ 
 









 If yes, please indicate your current gender identity: ______________________ 
 
 
5. Which of the following best describes your sexual orientation?  
 Bisexual  
 Gay  
 Lesbian  
 Queer  
 Questioning/Uncertain  
 Other (please specify): __________________________ 
  
6. Which word(s) or label(s) do you typically use to describe your sexual orientation? 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Highest level of education that you have completed: 
 Elementary School  
 Middle/Junior High School  
 High School/GED  
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 Some College/Technical School  
 Associate's Degree  
 Bachelor's Degree  
 Some Professional/Graduate School  
 Master's Degree 
 Doctoral Degree 
 
8. Which of the following best describes where you live presently? 
 Rural Area  
 Suburban Area  
 Urban Area  
 Other (please specify):  ___________________________ 
 
9. Current state/province of residence: ______________________________ 
 
10. Think of this scale as representing where the people stand in the United States. At the 
far right end of the scale are the people who are the best off—those who have the 
most money, the most education, and the most respected jobs. At the far left end of 
the scale are the people who are the worst off—those who have the least money, least 
education, and the least respected jobs or no job. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale, compared to all the other people in the United States?  
 
 Social Class Scale:  Lowest         
 Highest 
 
11. How did you hear about this study?
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APPENDIX F 
Sample Participant Recruitment Email 
We are writing to inform you about a research study that is currently being conducted at 
the University of Maryland on beliefs about sexual orientation. You are encouraged to 
participate if you identify as a member of the LGBT community or as any of the 
following: lesbian, gay, bisexual, bi-curious, queer, questioning, same-sex attracted, or 
otherwise exploring same-sex sexuality. Even if you prefer not to label yourself, we are 
interested in your experience! Participation involves the completion of several 
questionnaires and will take approximately 20-30 minutes. 
 
You can choose to assist with this project by forwarding this e-mail request to LGBT-
themed organizations and listservs, and/or to LGBT individuals. Questions about this 
study may be directed to Julie Arseneau at jra87@umd.edu or Dr. Ruth E. Fassinger at 
rfassing@umd.edu. This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of 
Maryland Institutional Review Board. 
 
After completing the survey, you may enter into a drawing for one of five $20 American 
Express gift cards that may be used at a store of your choosing. Your participation in 
this study is entirely voluntary and your responses will remain anonymous and 
confidential. You need not provide any identifying information, but will asked to submit 
an email address if you wish to enter the drawing.  
 
If you are interested in participating in this study please follow the link provided below or 
cut and paste the link into your web browser. 
 
[web address here] 
 
Thank you, 
Julie R. Arseneau, M.A. 
Doctoral Candidate, Counseling Psychology 
Department of Counseling & Personnel Services 
University of Maryland, College Park 
jra87@umd.edu 
 
Ruth E. Fassinger, Ph.D. 
Professor & Interim Chair 
Department of Counseling & Personnel Services 








Why is this research being done?  
This project is being conducted by Julie R. Arseneau, M.A. and Ruth Fassinger, Ph.D. at 
the University of Maryland, College Park. We are inviting you to participate in this 
research project if you identify as a person with a same-sex orientation or attraction (e.g., 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer). The purpose of this research project is to learn more about 
the opinions and beliefs of same-sex attracted people.  
 
What will I be asked to do?  
Participating in this study involves being asked to complete several questionnaires 
concerning your beliefs about sexual orientation, and social and religious attitudes. 
Participation in the study will take approximately 30 minutes. You are free to withdraw 
your consent to participate and may discontinue your participation in the study at any 
time. After submitting this form, you will be connected to the survey. Upon completion 
of the survey, you will have the opportunity to enter a drawing for one of five $20 
American Express gift cards. Entry into the drawing is completely voluntary.  
 
What about confidentiality?  
We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential. To help protect your 
confidentiality, we will not include identifiable information on data files. All computer 
files will be password-protected. However, due to the public nature of the internet, 
absolute confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. The possibility of someone intercepting 
your data is highly unlikely, although possible. It is therefore important that you exit your 
browser after you have submitted your survey. At the end of the survey, you will be given 
the opportunity to enter a drawing to win one of five $20 American Express gift cards. 
Participation in this drawing is completely voluntary. You must enter an email address to 
participate in the drawing; however, you do not need to enter your email address to 
participate in the survey. Your survey responses will not be linked to your email address; 
this information will be stored in two different data files. Email addresses entered for 
participation in the drawing will be kept in the researcher’s password- protected file and 
will be destroyed immediately following the drawing.  
 
What are the risks of this research?  
The only anticipated risk from participating in this research study is the possibility that 
some of the questions could elicit uncomfortable feelings. You may discontinue the 
survey at any time without consequence. 
  
What are the benefits of this research?  
This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help the 
investigators learn more about beliefs about sexual orientation held by same-sex attracted 
individuals. It is our hope that people might benefit from this study through improved 
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understanding of such opinions and beliefs.  
 
May I stop participating at any time?  
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take 
part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may withdraw your 
participation at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop 
participating at any time, you will not be penalized. However, only those who complete 
the survey will be given the option to enter their email address to participate in the 
drawing.  
 
What if I have questions?  
This research is being conducted by Julie R. Arseneau, M.A. and Ruth Fassinger, Ph.D. 
at the University of Maryland, College Park. If you have any questions about the research 
study itself, please contact Julie Arseneau at jra87@umd.edu or Ruth Fassinger at 
rfassing@umd.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, 
please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, 
MD, 20742; (e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-0678. This research has 
been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for 
research involving human subjects. 
 
 
Your acceptance indicates that:  
• you are at least 18 years of age;  
• the research has been explained to you;  
• your questions have been fully answered; and  
• you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research project.  
 
     




Debriefing Information for Participants 
  
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. The goal of this 
study is to learn more about the beliefs about sexual orientation held by same-sex 
attracted people. It is hoped that this information will be useful to psychologists, 
advocates, and policymakers in the future. 
 
Results of the study will be made available to participants upon request; contact Julie 
Arseneau at jra87@umd.edu. Lottery winners will be contacted by email. If you have 
entered the lottery, please be sure your email account settings will permit you to receive 
this notification from jra87@umd.edu. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, or would like to offer any 
feedback about the content of the surveys you just completed, you are encouraged to 
contact the researchers: Julie Arseneau at jra87@umd.edu or Ruth Fassinger, Ph.D. at 
rfassing@umd.edu. Questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant may 
be directed to the UMD IRB office at irb@deans.umd.edu; phone 301-405-0678. 
 
Thank you again! 
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APPENDIX I 
Measures for Establishing Validity 
 
Personal Need for Structure Scale (Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1989)  
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each 
according to your attitudes, beliefs, and experiences. It is important for you to realize that 
there are no "right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People are different, and we 
are interested in how you feel. Please respond according to the following 6-point scale:  
    
1 = strongly disagree  
2 = moderately disagree  
3 = slightly disagree  
4 = slightly agree  
5 = moderately agree  
6 = strongly agree  
 
1. It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.  
2. I'm not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine. (R)* 
3. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.  
4. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.  
5. I enjoy being spontaneous. (R) 
6. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious. (R) 
7. I don't like situations that are uncertain.  
8. I hate to change my plans at the last minute.  
9. I hate to be with people who are unpredictable.  
10. I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.  
11. I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations. (R) 
12. I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear.  
*(R) = Item is reversed scored.  
 
Right-wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 2006)** 
This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of 
social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and 
disagree with others, to varying extents.  Please indicate your reaction to each statement 
on the line to the left of each item according to the following scale: 
 
1 = very strongly disagree  
2 = strongly disagree 
3 = moderately disagree  
4 = slightly disagree  
5 = neutral 
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6 = slightly agree  
7 = moderately agree  
8 = strongly agree  
9 = very strongly agree 
 
1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to 
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.  
2. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.  
3. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and 
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to 
create doubt in people’s minds. 
4. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt 
every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.  
5. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our 
traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers 
spreading bad ideas. 
6. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.  
7. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if 
this   upsets many people.  
8. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away 
at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.  
9. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, 
even if it makes them different from everyone else.  
10. The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to 
live.  
11. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by 
protesting for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.   
12. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and 
take us back to our true path.  
13. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our 
government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed 
to be done.”  
14. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed 
before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.  
15. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it 
for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.  
16. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be.  The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.  
17. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the 
authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.  
18. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
19. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy 
“traditional family values.  
20. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just 
shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society. 
 
**Note: Counter-balanced items for this scale appear in italics. 
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Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992)  
INSTRUCTIONS: We are all members of different social groups or social categories. 
Some of such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, 
ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your memberships in 
those particular groups or categories, and respond to the following statements on the basis 
of how you feel about those groups and your memberships in them. There are no right or 
wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and 
opinions. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale 
from 1 to 7: 
 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree  
3 = Disagree Somewhat 
4 = Neutral 
5 = Agree Somewhat 
6 = Agree 
7 = Strongly Agree 
 
1.  I am a worthy member of the social groups I belong to. 
2.  I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do. (R)+ 
3.  Overall, my social groups are considered good by others.  
4.  Overall, my group memberships have very little to do with how I feel about myself. 
(R) 
5.  I feel I don't have much to offer to the social groups I belong to. (R) 
6.   In general, I'm glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to. 
7.  Most people consider my social groups, on the average, to be more ineffective than 
other social groups. (R) 
8.   The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am. 
9.   I am a cooperative participant in the social groups I belong to. 
10. Overall, I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are not 
worthwhile. (R) 
11. In general, others respect the social groups that I am a member of. 
12. The social groups I belong to are unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I 
am. (R) 
13. I often feel I'm a useless member of my social groups. (R) 
14. I feel good about the social groups I belong to. 
15. In general, others think that the social groups I am a member of are unworthy. (R) 
16. In general, belonging to social groups is an important part of my self image. 
+
 (R) = Item is reversed scored.  
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APPENDIX J 
Pattern Coefficients for Initial Four Factor Solution 
(Note: Coefficients less than .30 are suppressed in this table.) 
  
Item Number* Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
 33 .786       
 2 .720       
 20 .673       
 5 -.631       
 58 -.621       
 66 -.611       
 69 .600       
 56 .564       
 3 .541 -.314     
 39 .537       
 68 .496       
 27 -.480       
 43 -.474       
 28 -.473     -.323 
 38 .471       
 65 .464       
 10 .433       
 13 -.428       
 21 .383 -.344     
 31 .383       
 48 -.373     -.309 
 8 -.329       
 50         
 42         
 16         
 45         
 67         
 44   .702     
 30   .685     
 9   .666     
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 61   .632     
 53   .607     
 23 -.321 -.591     
 46 .303 .562     
 59   -.559     
 40 -.351 -.507     
 12   -.491     
 25 -.310 -.404     
 4   -.316     
 26   .301     
 6         
 7         
 17         
 63         
 51     .614   
 41     .553   
 18     .470   
 1     .457   
 19     .457   
 32     .425   
 49     .413   
 11     .412   
 55     .385   
 36     .383   
 60     .379   
 35     .377   
 34     .366   
 37     .352   
 15     .314   
 70     .304   
 52         
 71         
 14       .694 
 47       .589 
 57       -.559 
 54       .375 
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 29       .354 
 64   -.318   -.344 
 22       .340 
 62         
 24         
*Full text of each item by number can be found in Appendix D
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APPENDIX K 
Structure Coefficients for Initial Four Factor Solution 
(Note: Coefficients less than .30 are suppressed in this table.) 
  
 Item Number* Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
 33 .772 .346     
 2 .710 .334     
 20 .674 .347     
 58 -.641       
 5 -.634       
 66 -.611       
 69 .603       
 68 .587 .462     
 43 -.549 -.321     
 39 .540       
 10 .528 .431     
 65 .516       
 28 -.509     -.381 
 56 .507       
 38 .492 .303     
 27 -.480       
 3 .428       
 31 .388       
 13 -.380       
 8 -.378       
 50 .370       
 42 -.346       
 45         
 21         
 53 .470 .716 .304   
 30   .714 .414   
 23 -.559 -.693     
 46 .544 .688     
 44   .676 .395   
 61   .641 .376   
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 9   .630 .317   
 40 -.551 -.598     
 12   -.510     
 59   -.506     
 25 -.473 -.500     
 26   .384 .354   
 64   -.379   -.377 
 4   -.372     
 6   -.310     
 17   -.301     
 7         
 63         
 51     .610   
 41     .548   
 11     .489 .309 
 18     .465   
 1     .463   
 19     .445   
 49     .435   
 37     .415 .326 
 34     .406   
 32     .401   
 60     .398   
 55     .392   
 70   .327 .387   
 35     .384   
 15   .338 .368   
 36     .321   
 52         
 71         
 67         
 14       .705 
 47       .624 
 57       -.540 
 54       .399 
 22       .365 
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 62 .346     .353 
 48 -.320     -.332 
 29       .318 
 24         
 16         
*Full text of each item by number can be found in Appendix D
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Appendix L 
Final Structure Coefficients for 35-item SOBS 










Biology is the main basis of an individual’s sexual 
orientation. 
 
 0.772       
Sexual orientation is innate. 
 
 0.729       
Something deep inside of a person determines her or 
his sexual orientation. 
 
 0.648       
Individuals choose their sexual orientation. 
 
 0.633       
People have control over changing or keeping their 
sexual orientation. 
 
 0.631       
Social and environmental factors are the main basis 
of an individual’s sexual orientation. 
 
 0.598       
If someone comes out as gay or lesbian they were 
probably attracted to the same sex all along. 
 
 0.596 0.393     
It is impossible to truly change one’s sexual 
orientation. 
 
 0.548       
The idea that individuals have a "sexual orientation" 
is a social invention. 
 
 0.541       
Sexual orientation is set early on in life. 
 
 0.537 0.387     
The percentages of people in different sexual 
orientation groups are roughly the same all over 
the world. 
 
 0.529       
The existence of different sexual orientations is 
natural. 
 
 0.522       
Sexual orientation is a category with clear 
boundaries: A person is either gay/lesbian, 
bisexual, or heterosexual. 
 
   0.793 0.420   
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Sexual orientation is a category with distinct 
boundaries: A person is either gay/lesbian or 
heterosexual. 
 
   0.767 0.366   
A person has only one true sexual orientation. 
 
 0.484 0.680     
People who identify as bisexual are confused about 
their true sexual orientation. 
 
   0.676 0.361   
People may reasonably identify as two sexual 
orientations at the same time. 
 
   0.474     
It is possible to be “partially” or “somewhat” gay or 
straight. 
 
   0.473     
Individuals with the same sexual orientation seem to 
be connected to one another by some invisible 
link. 
 
     0.632   
People who have the same sexual orientation are 
very similar to one another. 
 
     0.557   
It is possible to know about many aspects of a 
person once you know her or his sexual 
orientation. 
 
     0.525   
There are more similarities than differences among 
people who have the same sexual orientation. 
 
     0.520   
Knowing a person’s sexual orientation tells you a lot 
about them. 
 
     0.512 0.334 
It is usually possible to know a person's sexual 
orientation even without being told. 
 
     0.464   
People who share the same sexual orientation pursue 
common goals. 
 
     0.442   
People who have the same sexual orientation interact 
frequently with one another. 
 
     0.415   
People tend to have a sense of group belonging 
based on their sexual orientation. 
 
     0.375   
People with the same sexual orientation share a 
common fate. 
     0.370   
141 
Sexual orientation is an important characteristic of 
people. 
 
       0.802 
A person's sexual orientation is an important 
attribute. 
 
       0.739 
Using terms like "lesbian," "gay," "bisexual," and 
"heterosexual" only reinforces stereotypes. 
 
       0.469 
If you don’t know a person’s sexual orientation, you 
can’t really say that you know that person. 
 
       0.388 
Most people view their sexual orientation as 
important to them. 
 
       0.372 
It's useful to group people according to their sexual 
orientation. 
 
       0.349 
People have access to different amounts of social 
power depending upon their sexual orientation. 
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Appendix M 
Correlation Matrix of Scores on SOBS Factors, NSS, RWA, and CSES 
   
 
NSS RWA CSES Membership Private Public Identity 
Naturalness α -.025 -.056 .047 .140* .004 .061 -.047 
  N 312 296 309 316 317 321 317 
Discreteness α .094 .280** .054 .030 -.023 .104 .028 
  N 320 303 317 323 325 328 324 
Entitativity α .096 .084 .121* .023 -.060 .142* .123* 
  N 316 299 310 317 318 322 318 
Importance α .117* -.184** .324** .245** .185** -.110* .486** 
  N 318 301 314 321 322 326 322 
NSS α  .029 -.075 -.124* -.112* -.096 .047 
  N  297 311 317 318 322 319 
RWA α   -.296** -.280** -.322** -.019 -.192** 
  N   295 300 302 304 300 
CSES Total α    .796** .805** .498** .698** 
  N    319 319 319 319 
Membership  α     .662** .195** .435** 
     CSE N     323 326 322 
Private CSE α      .224** .463** 
  N      327 323 
Public CSE α       -.024 
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